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DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF THE
FEMALE OFFENDER IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM*
LAWRENCE BERSHAD"
A new social consciousness as to the status of men and women in our society has
developed in recent years. Debate over this status has often centered around the proper
roles of men and women and how each group should be treated vis-a-vis the other. While
the debate may never produce lasting answers, the consensus appears to be that at the
very least some level of equality or parity is required.
Gender debates have a counterpart in the criminal justice system. While offenders
cannot be viewed as representing the mainstream of society, their needs and goals are
similar to the aims of members of the general society. Presumably, many want to improve
their standard of living, obtain good jobs, have and maintain families, be free from
sickness, vindicate their legal rights, and engage in recreational activities. Therefore,
although there is a heightened level of security and a more restrictive atmosphere, the
aspirations of individuals within the prison community may he seen as a microcosm of
society as a whole.
Whatever crimes they committed, most inmates will one day return to society.
Although some releasees will never he rehabilitated or lead law-abiding lives, others will.
For inmates with such potential, the correctional environment is a key factor in preparing
them for their eventual return to the mainstream of society.
The task of establishing this environment — correctional programming' — is a
function of the executive branch of government. A significant developing issue in the area
of correctional programming is whether or not government should take a more active
role in the area of gender equality by set ting examples in its administration of correctional
institutions.
The mandate of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is that.
"[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
'I' Copyright g 1985 Boston College Law School.
*Much of the material for this article is derived from a program presented by the author at
workshops for correct ional administrators sponsored by the National Institute of Correctional Jail
Center of the Department of justice. The views expressed, however, are the views of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of justice.
** B.A. University of Connecticut, 1961; J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, 1964; Profes-
sor of Law, Seton Hall University School or Law; Criminal Justice Fellow, Harvard University Law
School, 1971-72; Vice-Chairman, Advisory Council on Corrections for the State of New Jersey;
former Chairman of the Legal Issues Committee of the American Correctional Association; former
Vermont Commissioner of Corrections; former Legal Advisor to the District of Columbia Depart-
ment of Corrections. The author wishes specifically to acknowledge the research and editorial
assistance of Edward Bertele, J.D. Seton Hall University School of Law, 1975; Curtis Woods, J.D.
Seton Hall University School or Law, 1983; and Christopher M. Hartwyk, J.D. Seton Hall University
School of Law, 1985.
1 Correctional programming is the entire process into which an inmate is assimilated when
incarcerated. Elements of correctional programming include classification and designation, em-
ployment, job-training, rehabilitation, and education. Correctional programming regulates the daily
life of inmates. See THE MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL. STANDARDS XX (American Correctional Associa-
tion 3d ed. 1966) (referring to Declarations of Principles, American Correctional Association, Principle
VII) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL. OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS].
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laws." 2 An examination of state legislation and the factual findings of courts that have
reviewed the administration of correctional institutions for women show that many states
have not been diligent in providing female prisoners with equal protection under the law.
Possibly the reason for the lack of concern about the equal treatment of women in
correctional institutions is that women prisoners do not provide a powerful enough
constituency to stimulate legislative and administrative action. While male prisoners
create temporary and often substantial improvements through the process of riot and
reform, the resulting benefits for women prisoners have been less dramatic. Hy failing to
improve the conditions of incarceration for women at the same time improvements are
made to benefit male prisoners, states are not signaling female offenders that the way to
achieve reform is to riot. It is reasonable to assume, however, that female inmates are
aware of a greater receptivity to gender-related issues and may make demands for equal
treatment because of that awareness.
One measure of the concern about gender-related issues is the emergence of class
action suits by female prisoners. Aided by a new test' to determine the constitutionality of
various conditions and aspects of confinement, and perhaps a more realistic orientation
by the public and subsequently the courts toward women, female prisoners have achieved
some success in obtaining parity of treatment with male prisoners. Judicial mandates,
however, have not been entirely satisfactory. While a process that can be precise and that
bases decisions on the proven values of the past has some merit in the correctional
context, these proven values of the past are often wrought with sex-discrimination and
chauvinism and often embody penological theory reminiscent of the-dark ages. 4 Each of
the judicial decisions in this area reflects an attempt to adhere to the time-honored legal
practice of reaching back in the wealth of legal precedents for guidance in arriving at a
decision and fashioning a remedy. This system based on stare decisis will not solve the
problems of the correctional system outside the factual context of the particular ca -se
presented for decision. Many issues, sex discrimination foremost' among these, can only
be resolved through innovative and revolutionary change — developed and initiated not.
by courts but by legislatures and correctional administrators. One of the major conclu-
sions to be drawn from recent decisions is that while courts have become a solution of last
resort, they have only a limited role in regulating the criminal justice system.
This article will review the needs of female offenders and the manner in which courts
have applied the intermediate level of analysis for determining whether disparate treat-
ment of female and male offenders is constitutional. Although the needs of' women in
some areas are greater than the needs of men, proportionately fewer resources have been
allocated for meeting the needs of female prisoners than have been allocated for males in
correctional institutions. Courts, legislatures, and correctional administrators must strike
a balance between the goal of parity and the different physiological needs of male and
female prisoners. If parity is defined as essential equality and if it is recognized that male
2
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
The "new test" is also referred to as intermediate scrutiny and was first enunciated in Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The test enunciated in Craig requires that, to be valid, gender-based
classifications serve important government objectives and be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives.
4
 Society in general exhibits disdain for prisoners. In addition, society generally has been
reticent about accepting judicial or legislative mandates changing the role of women, and has resisted
claims of discrimination by women. Logic dictates that penological theories and theorists will reflect
these views and embody many of these prejudices.
March 1985]	 DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT	 391
and female pris.oners solely by virtue of their sex have different needs in the areas of
medical care, personal hygiene, parental rights, family relationships, and privacy, it
becomes obvious that a balance must be struck between parity of programs offered at
correctional institutions and the prisoners' needs. Often physiological differences make
equality both undesirable and unnecessary, In areas where no apparent difference in
physiological needs exists, 5 however, parity can only be achieved by offering equal
programs or equal opportunities!' Public attention has focused on the abhorrent condi-
tions of correctional institutions, but until recently this attention had focused on correc-
tional facilities for men. Recent case law spurred scrutiny of female facilities and needs of
female prisoners. •
In addition, this article will address methods for producing correctional reform.
Specifically, the article will discuss how administrative policies and procedures can be
molded to address and correct specific sex-related problems within the correctional
institution. Existing legislation is suggested as a model and discussed as a vehicle for
remedying discriminatory treatment. Furthermore, this article will examine uniform
national correctional standards and suggest application of these standards to state correc-
tions programs as a viable method of initiating change. Finally, the author hypothesizes
that the failure of the federal equal rights amendment and the birth of the New
Federalism may draw attention to an avenue of reform in individual states previously
ignored. To achieve the agreed upon goals of non-discriminatory treatment and reason-
able gentler parity, all three branches of government and correctional professionals must.
explore both traditional and non-traditional penological theory. ?
 In a gender sensitive
•area, the courts may be more receptive to gender-related complaints as a result of the
intermediate level of scrutiny afforded constitutional challenges to gender-based
classifications. While courts can provide temporary remedies, gender parity in the correc-
tional system must ultimately be achieved through legislation or enforcement of uniform
correctional standards.
I. THE EVOLVINC CONSTITUTIONAL. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SEX-BASED
CLASSIFICATIONS
Within the last decade, the United States Supreme Court has reassessed its approach
in analyzing the constitutionality of statutory classifications based on gender. The result of
this reassessment has been the evolution of the "intermediate tier of review" for gender-
based classifications. Prior to 1971, a line of Supreme Court cases" held that statutorily
5 Used here, "needs" applies to psychological as well as physiological needs.
• This essential equality of programs and opportunities is applicable to such areas as legal advice
and legal resources, vocational training, work release, and recreation. This list is not exhaustive but is
rather representative of the types of programs which require equality.
▪ Penological theory is used by the author to denote the rationale for dealing with the adjudi-
cated criminal as implemented by the states' formal system of criminal justice. It includes but is not
limited to such concepts as retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.
• See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (jury selection excluded women unless they
applied); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (women prohibited from serving as bartenders
unless married to tavern owner); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wail) 130 (1872) (women excluded
from the practice of law). 'These cases had the effect of denying women certain opportunities upon
grounds of administrative convenience, preservation of the home or the virtue of women. Other
cases were predicated upon the protection of women from physical hardships. See, e.g., West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (minimum wage law for women); Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908) (maximum working hours for women).
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created sex discrimination did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment if' some rational basis existed to justify the different treatment. of similarly
situated males and females." Gender discriminatory statutes were accorded a presump-
tion of validity by the Court. i 0 Individuals who alleged a denial of equal protection had
the burden of establishing that the legislation was without a rational basis or was unrelated
to the achievement of a valid purpose." The Court almost always upheld gender discrim-
inatory statutes.' The cases reaching the Supreme Court were merely representative of a
large body of lower federal and state court decisions sustaining sex discrimination in a
myriad of' sit uai ions including professional and occupational licensing, employment prac-
tices, property rights, domestic relations, and criminal liability and punishment. 13
The Court broke the tradition of upholding sex-based discriminatory legislation
which met the rational basis test in Reed y. Reed . 1-1 In Reed, the mother of a minor decedent
contested the statutory preference given to the father to serve as administrator of the
deceased child's estate.' 5 An Idaho statute did not allow the exercise of any discretion by
the probate court in appointing an administrator of an estate, but simply mandated that
"males must be preferred to females." 1 e The Idaho Supreme Court interpreted this
provision as authorizing the appointment of male administrators where both a male and a
female were equally qualified for the sake of administrative convenience.' 7 The United
States Supreme Court, however, held that a preference given to males for administrative
convenience alone was arbitrary and did not satisfy the fourteenth amendment.' Reed is
significant because until that time the Court had routinely accepted any preferred basis
for the discriminatory treatment of women, and had on occasion provided its own
rational justification, if none was forthcoming.'"
The same standard of review has been applied where federal legislation is alleged to be
discriminatory under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636, 638 (1975). The rational basis test determines whether a classification is rational,
whether it furthers a proper government purpose and whether all persons within the classes
established are treated equally. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59-62 (1961).
I° John & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675
(1971).
" Id. at 678-82.
'" Id.
' 3
 Id.
' 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
15 Id. at 73.
le Id.
17 See Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511,  514, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
"4 404 U.S. at 76-77.
See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). In Goesaert, the Supreme Court upheld a
stare statute providing that a woman could not be a licensed bartender unless she was the wile or
daughter of the bar-owner. Id. at 467. The Court conjectured that the legislature must have
distinguished between wives and daughters of bartenders and other women because "Michigan
evidently believes that the oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a barmaid's husband or
father minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid without such protecting oversight." Id. at 466.
The dissent, however, thought that this reason could not be the justification for the statute since the
statute allowed male bar-owner's wives and daughters to tend bar even in the absence of the male
owner, although preventing other women from tending bar even if a man was present to keep order.
Id. at 468 (Rutledge, J., joined by Douglas and Murphy, JJ., dissenting). Similar reasoning was
criticized by the dissent in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960), where the Supreme Court
upheld the denial of Social Security benefits to certain persons living abroad on the basis of
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Reed was subsequently used by the Court in Frontiero v, Richardson" as the basis for
holding that sex was a suspect classification requiring application of the strict scrutiny
test. 21
 Frontiero struck down a federal statute which conditioned benefits to the husbands
of Air Force servicewomen upon a showing of dependency, but did not require such a
showing for benefits to be given to wives of servicemen. 22
 Similarly, the Court, in Wein-
berger v. Weisenfeld," invalidated a federal restriction on Social Security benefits available
to widowers, but not widows, in cases where a surviving spouse had minor children. 24
Although the Weinberger Court relied on Frontiero to reach its decision," the opinion
contains none of the "strict scrutiny" language espoused in Frontiero. The Court in Craig v.
Boren 2° apparently resolved its philosophical differences about the status of sex-based
classifications by adopting a new test. 27 Craig involved a state statute prohibiting the sale of
liquor to men under 21 and women under 19." Under the test announced in Craig,
gender-based classifications do not violate the equal protection clause if they serve "im-
portant government objectives" and are "substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." 29
 This level of scrutiny lies somewhere between the strict scrutiny and rational
basis tests. In addition to using intermediate scrutiny to invalidate gender classifications
based merely on stereotypes and administrative convenience, courts have used the inter-
mediate scrutiny test to validate statutory classifications resulting in advantages to women,
based upon Congressional intent to provide compensation to women for previous disad-
vantages women have suffered because of their gender." An exception to the use of
intermediate scrutiny in review of statutory classifications still exists regarding the need
for protection or punishment. Typically these statutes are still reviewed under the ra-
tional basis test on the assumption that men and women are not similarly situated with
respect to the need for protection or punishmental
Thus, judicial review of sex-based classifications under the intermediate scrutiny
standard now focuses on whether males and females are similarly situated or whether a
statutory classification is based upon mere "administrative convenience and outworn
presumed congressional motives of economy. The dissent criticized the decision as being sustained
on the basis of "implication and vague conjecture." See id. at 640 (Brennan, J., joined by Warren, C.J.,
and Douglas, J., dissenting).
20
 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
21 Id. at 682. The strict scrutiny test requires not only that the rational basis test be met but also
that the classification or discrimination be necessary to promote some important state interest and
that no less burdensome alternative be available to achieve the governmental objective. Dunn v,
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972).
22
 411 U.S. at 688-91.
23
 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
" Id. at 643.
25 Id. at 642-43, 645.
" 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
27 Id. at 199.
20 Id. at 192.
29 Id. at 197. See also Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981).
3° See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (women allowed to exclude more
lower-income years in computing old-age benefits than men). The Court had previously sustained
government programs intended as ameliorative of prior discrimination even using the rational basis
test. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 505-08 (1975) (women officers given longer
statutory period to advance in rank before mandatory discharge); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351,
355-56 (1974) (widows, but not widowers, allowed annual property-tax exemption).
" See, e.g., People v. Reilly, 85 Misc. 2d 702, 707-08, 381 N.Y.S.2d 732, 738-39 (1976).
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cliches."" Application of the "similarly situated" test sometimes leads to results that are
hard to reconcile, as is evidenced by the holdings in two cases decided on the same day by
the Supreme Court. In Caban v. Mohammed," the Court held that New York could not
deny the father of an illegitimate child the right to consent to adoption of the child, where
the state required the consent of the mother. 34 After applying the intermediate test, the
Court found no fundamental difference between unwed mothers and fathers.' The
Court rejected an administrative convenience argument that adoption of illegitimate
children would be encouraged if only the mother had to consent- 36 In Parham v. Hughes,"
the Court found a Georgia statute that permitted the mother but not the father of an
illegitimate child to sue for the child's wrongful death consistent with equal protection . 38
The Court relied upon a Georgia law providing that only the father could legitimate the
child. 39
 Fonr justices dissented on the grounds that the state should not be allowed to use
one sex-based statutory provision to justify the imposition of another."
These seemingly anomalous results obtained by application of the intermediate
standard of review indicate that the law relevant to gender classifications will continue to
develop on a case-by-case basis. The intermediate level of scrutiny does establish a logical
framework, however, for evaluating judicial responses to challenges to discriminatory
aspects of the criminal justice system brought by female offenders. While sex-based
discriminatory treatment is pervasive in the criminal justice system,'" the United States
Supreme Court has decided only one case involving criminal activity where a sex-based
classification was under constitutional attack." The job of shaping the bounds of equal
protection as applied to gender-based classifications in the criminal justice system thus has
been performed by the state and lower federal courts. In the next section of the article,
judicial disposition of claims involving discrimination in assigning criminal liability and
determining sentences" and discriminatory treatment of women in penal institutions will
be examined."
32
 Parham v. Hughes, 941 U.S. 347, 355 (1979). See also Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89
(1979) (presumption that father is breadwinner and mother is "center of home and family life" is
part of "baggage of sexual stereotypes").
" 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
34 Id. at 394.
n Id. at 389.
33 Id. at 389-91.
" 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
3" Id. at 358.
23 Id. at 352-53.
4° Id. at 361-62 (White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
41
 See infra text accompanying notes 45-387 for discussion of gender discrimination in the
criminal justice system.
See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). Michael M, was a
seventeen and one-half year old male charged with statutory rape under a California law which only
provided criminal liability for men engaged in an act of sexual intercourse with a female minor. The
statute was challenged on equal protection grounds and was found not to violate the fourteenth
amendment equal protection guarantee. Prior to this decision, various attempts to bring sexual
discrimination in the criminal process before the Court have been unsuccessful. E.g., Meloon v.
Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977), dent denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978) (statutory rape by males
only); In re Fenwick, 110 Ohio 350, 144 N.E. 269 (1924), appeal dismissed for lack of substantial federal
question sub nom. Fenwick v. Myers, 275 U.S. 985 (1927) (indeterminate sentences for women
offenders).
33 See infra text accompanying notes 45-107 for a discussion of gender-based discrimination
claims in imposing criminal liability and sentencing.
" See infra text accompanying notes 108-387 for a discussion of discriminatory treatment of
women. in the criminal justice system.
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II. SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT IN CRIMINAL STATUTES AND AT SENTENCING
A. Criminal Liability Based on Gender
The legal system appears to accept the notion that an individual's gender is a
sufficient and rational consideration when imposing criminal liability. Criminal statutes
discriminate between the sexes by defining crimes that can be committed by only one sex
and by imposing different sentences on the offender according to sex. In addition,
criminal statutes that are gender-neutral on their face are often applied in a discrimina-
tory manner.
Typically, behavior proscribed for one sex only is related to sexual misconduct such
as forcible rape, statutory rape, carnal knowledge, seduction, and to a lesser extent,
prostitution. Punishment of forcible rape, only when committed by a male against a
female, has been uniformly sustained by the courts as a permissible discrimination based
on gender." These findings can be justified when one considers that more women are
subjected to forcible sexual relations by men than men from women. Additionally,
physiological evidence of forcible rape of women can he more readily obtained, and it is
obviously much more difficult for a woman to force a man to have sex." As previously
mentioned, the standard of review employed is typically the rational basis test, on the
assumption that men and women are not similarly situated with respect to the need for
protection or punishment:"
Statutory rape is normally defined as sexual relations between an adult male and a
female minor. The majority of courts have found gender-based classifications in the
statutory rape statutes consistent with equal protection principles under either the "ra-
tional basis"" or "strict scrutiny" tests:* The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, however, held New Hampshire's statutory rape provision unconstitutional using
the intermediate level of review in Meloon v. Helgemoe .'" Arguments offered by the state to
justify forcible rape statutes included prevention of pregnancy, psychological harm to the
female, and physiological differences between male and female minors." The First
Circuit rejected all these contentions as being unsupported by the evidence, 52 reasoning
that the state had been unable to prove its contentions and had merely relied upon
stereotypical notions of male-female sex roles.
45 E.g., State v. Kelly, 111 Ariz. 181, 184, 526 P.2d 720, 723 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935
(1975); People v. Gould, 188 Colo. 113, 115-16, 532 P.2d 953, 954-55 (1975); People v. Medrano, 24
Ill. App. 3d 429, 431-32, 321 N.E.2d 97, 98-99 (1974); Brooks v. State, 24 Md. App. 334, 337-39, 330
A.2d 670, 673 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975); People v. Reilly, 85 Misc. 2d 702, 703-10,.381 N.Y.S.2d
732, 735-40 (1976); State v. Giles, 34 N.C. App. 112, 113-14, 237 S.E.2d 305, 306-07 (1977); State v.
Ewald, 63 Wis. 2d 165, 172-74, 216 N.W.2d 213, 217-18 (1979).
" See Finley v. State, 527 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
47 See, e.g., People v. Reilly, 85 Misc. 2d 702, 707-08, 381 N.Y.S.2d 732, 738-39 (076). See supra
text accompanying note 31.
.e
	 e.g., People v. Mackey, 46 Cal. App. 3d 755, 760.61, 120 Cal. Rptr. 157, 160, cert. denied,
423 U.S. 951 (1975); People v. Salinas, 191 Colo. 171, 174, 551 P.2d 703, 706 (1976); People v.
Mndange-Pfupfu, 97 Misc. 2d 496, 499-502, 911 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1003 (1978); State v. Wilson, 296
N.C. 298, 306, 250 S.E.2d 621, 629 (1979); Ex parte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978); State v. Housekeeper, 588 P.2d 139, 140 (Utah 1978).
as See, e.g., State v: Thompson, 162 N.J. Super. 302, 304, 392 A.2d 678, 679 (1978).
5° 563 F.2d 602, 603-04 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978).
51 Id. at 605.
22 Id. at 606-08. Contra State v. Thompson, 162 N.J. Super. 302, 306, 392 A.2d 678, 680 (1978);
State v. Wilson, 296 N.C. 298, 306, 250 S.E.2d 621, 629 (1979).
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Subsequent decisions in other jurisdictions have not adopted the result in Meloon."
The Supreme Court addressed the subject in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
County" and in a plurality opinion held discriminatory statutory rape laws constitutional.
Restating policy reasons similar to the justifications proffered by the state in Meloon,55 the
Court reasoned that the requirement that the gender-based classification bear a fair and
substantial relationship to an important governmental interest" was met when the legisla-
ture decided to punish "the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the consequences of
his condUct," 57 Furthermore, the Court compared the risk of pregnancy with the risk of
criminal sanctions and concluded that a statutory rape provision "imposed solely on males
. serves to roughly 'equalize' the deterrents on the sexes."66 In the aftermath of Michael
M. , it seems fair to say that under any and all standards statutory rape statutes like the
New Hampshire statute challenged in Meloon are constitutional.
Carnal knowledge statutes are another means of protecting women from sexual
abuse. These statutes differ from rape laws in that physical force is not involved in the
proscribed conduct. Lack of consent may exist due to the inability of the woman to
consent because of mental incapability, for example," or because of duress, as for
example abuse by male guards of female inmates or pat ients, 6° or because of a psychologi-
cal dependence, such as the existence of a doctor-patient relationship." Many states have
recently revised their carnal abuse statutes to apply even-handedly to both males and
females, not because of constitutional attack, but as part of the general revisions of states'
criminal codes. 6' Courts in the states retaining "male only" carnal abuse statutes are not
likely to overturn them in view of the nearly universal judicial and legislative acceptance
of gender-based distinctions in the rape laws.
Seduction is the use of a promise to marry or other deception by a male to induce a
female to have sexual intercourse. 83 Seduction was not a crime at common law but a
number of states have included seduction as a crime in their criminal codes." The essence
" Helgemoe v. Meloon, 436 U.S. 950 (1978). The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun would
have granted certiorari and reversed summarily. Id.
" 450 U.S. 464 (1981). See generally Comment, Gender-Based Statutory Rape Legislation and the
Equal Protection Clause: Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 19 Am. GRIM. L. REV. 99
(1981).
" Michael M., 450 U.S. at 470-73. See supra text accompanying note 51.
se 450 U.S. at 469, 473. Justice Rehnquist's opinion does not specifically acknowledge review
under the standard of intermediate scrutiny. The opinion does, however, reject California's applica-
tion of strict scrutiny and cites the test defined in Reed v. Reed, and later refined in Craig v. Boren,
requiring the classification to bear a substantial relationship to important governmental purposes.
Thus, the Court, without specific acknowledgment, apparently adopted an intermediate tier of
review.
57 Michael M., 450 U.S. at 473.
50 Id.
58 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463(a)(2) (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 5 (West
1970).
80 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.342 (West 1968); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06 (1976); Wyo.
STAT. r 6-97 (1957).
61
 MICH. COMP. Laws ANN. §§ 750.90, 750.341 (West 1968).
" See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.1 -709.4, 709.8 (West 1979); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§
464-464C (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 272, §§ 3, 5 (Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:14-2 (Supp. 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03 (Supp. 1983).
" 70 AM. JuR. 2D Seduction § 3 (1973).
" See Note, Sex Discrimination in the Criminal Law: The Effect of the Equal Rights Amendment, 11 AM.
Glum. L. REV. 469, 474-75 Sc n.33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Discrimination).
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of the offense is deprivation of a woman's virtue, the "brightest jewel in the crown of her
womanhood," by trick or artifice. 65
 The inclusion of this offense in criminal codes further
exemplifies the special status women have been accorded based upon the conventional
wisdom that they are more vulnerable to undesired sexual intercourse than men. The
constitutional issue of gender discrimination in this context has not been raised in any
reported case but courts are likely to consider the vulnerability of women as sufficient
justification for the validity of seduction statutes t.hat. classify according to gender.
Prostitution laws are constantly being attacked as examples of overt sexual discrimi-
nation, either because the statutes prohibiting the conduct are directed at females but not
males, or because the laws 'do not provide for criminal liability for patrons, or finally,
because the laws are discriminatorily enforced. Although prostitution is usually defined as
the offer by a woman to have sexual intercourse for pay," a majority of states have
adopted sex-neutral prostitution statutes.67 Many of the states having sex-neutral prostitu-
tion laws do not impose any criminal liability upon the prostitute's patron." Since the
decision not to criminalize the acts of the patron is not based upOn sexual differences, it
does not constitute a suspect classification or raise a gender discrimination issue to be
analyzed under the intermediate scrutiny standard, and therefore need only be justified
on a rational basis."
The policy supporting criminal liability for the prostitute only focuses on the status of
the prostitute and the patron in prostitution transactions. The prostitute is engaged in
continuous and indiscriminate sexual activity, while the patron is only sporadically in-
volved. If the intent of prostitution laws is to prevent the spread of venereal disease and to
maintain certain standards of public decency, it is questionable whether a statute proscrib-
ing criminal liability for the prostitute but not the patron could even withstand the
minimum scrutiny test, since the patron is equally capable of causing the undesired
effects."
The potential for sex-based discrimination also exists in the enforcement of sex-
neutral prostitution laws. Even where laws treat prostitute and patron, male or female,
equally, police may only attempt to secure convictions of female prostitutes." While the
" People v. Gould, 70 Mich. 240, 245, 38 N.W. 232, 235 (1888). See 70 Am. juR. 2d Seduction § 3
(1973).
See People v. Robinson, 4 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 1017, 84 Cal. Rptr. 922, 923 (1970); Salt Lake
City v. Allred, 19 Utah 2d 254, 257, 430 P.2d 371, 372 (1967).
" See Rosenbleet & Pariente, The Prostitution of the Criminal Law, 11 AM. Cum. L. REV. 373,
422-27 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rosenbleet & Pariente]. Three states that still retain female only
prostitution statutes, however, have upheld the constitutionality of the statutes against equal protec-
tion attack. See Wilson v. State, 258 Ind. 3, 6-7, 278 N.E.2d 569, 570-71, cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928
(1972); State v. Devall, 302 So. 2d 909, 913 (La. 1974); State v. Mertes, 60 Wis. 2d 414, 418-19, 210
N.W.2d 741, 744 (1973). But see State v. Woods, No. 443072 (Minneapolis, Minn. Munic. Ct., Dec. 21,
1971) (female only prostitution ordinance held unconstitutional). Rosenbleet & Pariente, supra, at
422-27.
a Cf. Rosenbleet & Pariente, supra note 67, at 403.
" See Blake v. State, 344 A.2d 260, 262-63 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975); Commonwealth v. King, 374
Mass. 5, 17-19, 372 N.E.2d. 196, 204 (1977).
" But see State v. Hicks, 360 A.2d 150, 153-54 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976) (rational basis for imposing
greater penalty on prostitute than patron).
n See, e.g., People v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 19 Cal. 3d 338, 349, 562 P.2d 1315,
1320, 138 Cal. Rptr. 66, 71 (1977) (police employed more male decoys). Other more subtle forms of
discrimination may also exist, for example, imposing different standards of proof required for
conviction. In one jurisdiction, male prostitution for purposes of sodomy must be established by
corroboration whereas other forms of prostitution need not be corroborated. Compare Wajer v.
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courts have recognized discriminatory enforcement of penal laws as a valid defense to
prosecution, 72
 the defendant asserting gender discrimination as. a defense must make a
strong showing of purposeful discrimination. Because gender is not yet a suspect
classification," evidence that only women are arrested," even if by police department.
policy," has been deemed insufficient to establish intentional discrimination. Given the
Supreme Court's interest in eradicating sex-based discriminatory treatment, something
less than a strong showing of intentional enforcement against one sex should be sufficient
to meet the burden of proof on this issue.
The foregoing analysis of statutes imposing criminal liability based on gender is
intended to be an illustrative and not exhaustive survey of crimes limited to one sex."
These examples demonstrate that legislatures and courts have continued to adhere to the
notion that gender represents a valid basis For distinction in imposing criminal liability.
Because in most cases women have been shielded from prosecution for acts which would
be criminal if' committed by men, the impact of these laws on women is al least supe-
rficially benign. The harm, however, lies in the attitudes that such laws foster. The
underlying theme is that men and women are different and as such can be treated
differently — and unequally — in practices involving sentencing and conditions of
incarceration.
B. Sentencing Disparity
Although courts have struck down gender-based disparities in sentencing statutes on
equal protection grounds, courts generally continue to accept disparities justified by
physiological differences." The protective attitude toward women that underlies enact-
ment of rape and other statutes directed at men only is further manifested in sentencing
laws. One type of sentencing statute involves the imposition of indeterminate sentences
upon women for the same crimes for which males would receive fixed terms. Conven-
tional wisdom concerning female offenders was that women were more susceptible to
rehabilitation than men and thus should be kept institutionalized for as long as needed to
United States, 222 A.2d 68, 69 (D.C. 1966) (no corroboration needed to commit female prostitute)
with Kelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (corroboration required in conviction
of male for homosexual conduct).
72
 Vick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). See also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.
625, 626-32 (1972).
" See, e.g., Cook v. City of Price, 566 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d
264 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970).
n See, e.g., Blake v. State, 344 A.2d 260, 263 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975).
7' See Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 5, 372 N.E.2d 196 (1977). In this case the court affirmed
the conviction of a female for prostitution despite a showing by the defendant that the police
department had a policy of arresting females, but not males, for violating the prostitution statute. Id.
at 18, 372 N.E.2d at 205. The court reasoned that the defendant had offered no evidence on the
issue of whether male prostitutes were charged with violations of other offenses, such as sodomy. Id.
at 18-19, 372 N.E.2d at 205. The court indicated, therefore, that given such a showing it would have
found for the defendant. The court also stated, in dictum, that under the then newly enacted equal
rights amendment to the state constitution gender was recognized as a suspect classification and that
discriminatory enforcement of the prostitution law would thereafter be unconstitutionalid. at 19-22,
372 N.E.2d at 205-07.
7' For a more comprehensive discussion of criminal liability predicated upon gender, see gener-
ally, Note, Discrimination, supra note 64.
77
 The authors here take notice that males and females are physically dissimilar. The differences
translate into varied needs in areas such as hygiene, medical care, food and nutrition, and clothing.
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achieve the desired goal." To implement this theory, some states created special facilities
for women and separate sentencing statutes for all offenders sent to such facilities."
Perhaps the most familiar example was the Pennsylvania statute known as the "Muncy
Act."" The Muncy Act required the sentencing judge to issue a general sentence to
women convicted of offenses punishable by more than one year imprisonment, to issue a
three-year sentence if the maximum permitted by law was three years or less, or to fix the
term at the maximum allowable where the permissible term was longer than three years."'
The sentencing judge, therefore, had no discretion to issue less than the maximum
sentence or to provide a minimum sentence with eligibility for parole for female offend-
ers, as could be done for male offenders." Another invidious effect of the Muncy Act was
that most women were sent to the penitentiary at Muncy for offenses which if committed
by a male would only result in a county jail term."
Constitutional attack on equal protection grounds brought about changes in the
Muncy Act and similar statutes in other states. Judicial decisions have invalidated the
indeterminate type of sentencing for women for a variety of reasons"' and have rejected
many of the stereotypes" that still pervade the legislative treatment of criminal liability of
women. In Commonwealth v. Daniel,'" the court, in overturning the Pennsylvania Muncy
Act, held that no rational basis existed to distinguish between men and women in the
imposition of a sentence for the same crime."
In State v. Chambers, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, noting the fundamental
nature of the interest involved, subjected that state's sentencing statute to a rigorous
process of evaluation." Earlier, when the issue of unequal sentencing treatment for
7.6 See Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REv,
297, 326-27 (1974); Temin, Discriminatory Sentencing of Women Offenders: The Argument for ERA in a
Nutshell, II Am. CRIM. L. REV. 355, 358 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Temini.
7° States that had authorized the establishment of rehabilitative institutions included Connec-
ticut, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. See Temin, supra note 78, at 358 & n.15.
"° PA. STAT. ANN. lit. 61, § 566 (Purdon 1964), amended by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 566 (Purdon
Supp. 1984).
SL Id.
" See,e.g., Commonwealth v. Sheaffer, 149 Pa. Super. 51, 53, 63, 23 A.2d 215, 217, 221 (1941).
" See Temin, supra note 78, at 360-61.
" The reasons given by courts for invalidating indeterminate sentencing include fourteenth
amendment equal protection grounds, violations of state constitutions, and public policy reasons that
embody the concept that the commission or like crimes requires the imposition of similar penalties.
" Examples of such stereotypes include the idea that an assault committed by a female cannot
be as damaging as an assault committed by a male, that prostitution is a woman's profession, and that
males deserve more severe punishment for incest than women. The most significant stereotype,
however, is the idea that women are more amenable to rehabilitation than men.
" 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
87
 Id. at 650, 243 A.2d at 404. The court noted the existence of physical and biological
differences between the sexes but said that none of these differences was relevant to a determination
of sentence. Id. at 649-50, 243 A.2d at 403-04.
" State v. Chambers, 63 N.J. 287, 296, 307 A.2d 78, 82 (1973). For comments on Chambers, see
Comment, Sex Discrimination — Disparate Sentencing of Male and Female Offenders Violates Equal
Protection — State v. Chambers, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 830 (1974); Comment, Sex Discrimination in
Sentencing Criminal Offenders is Unconstitutional, 50 N.D. L. REV, 359 (1974); Comment, State v.
Chambers: Sex Discrimination in Sentencing, 1 NEW ENC.. J. PRISON L. 138 {1974); Casenote, Disparate
Statutory Sentencing Schemes for Males and Females Declared Unconstitutional: State v. Chambers, 23
CATH. U.L. REV. 389 (1943).
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women offenders was first presented to the court," 9 the court had remanded the case for
rehearing, ruling that the State of New Jersey would be required to demonstrate a
"substantial justification empirically grounded to the greatest extent possible."' Subse-
quently, in State v. Chambers, the state attempted to show that the facilities for women were
intended to rehabilitate and that women were more amenable to such treatment than
men."' The court rejected the state's statistics on recidivism as being of questionable
validity.' According to the court, the state's evidence at the most established the existence
of emotional differences, but not of any "differences in capacity for intellectual achieve-
ment, self-perception, self-control, or the ability to change attitude and behavior, adjust to
social norms and accept responsibility."" Thus, the court held that there was no basis to
incarcerate only women for an indeterminate term."
A federal district court declared the Connecticut indeterminate sentencing statute to
be unconstitutional in United Slates ex rel. Robinson v. York`' under a "strict scrutiny"
approach."' The court rejected the same arguments raised in Chambers, 97 that is, that
women's institutions were rehabilitative and that longer sentences were required to
accomplish the desired goal." The court discussed deterrence as a goal but could not find
any evidence to sustain longer sentences for women predicated upon such a goal."
Chambers, Daniel, and Robinson are significant developments in the evolution of
sex-neutral sentencing provisions. These cases subjected the accepted notions of penolog-
ical treatment of female offenders to substantial scrutiny and discarded many sex-based
theories as unsubstantiated. Under the standards adopted in these cases, any future
sex-based classifications in sentencing statutes will have to be founded on empirical
evidence establishing a substantial justification to survive constitutional attack. A further
result of these cases may be a more critical evaluation of indeterminate sentencing
regardless of sex. The failure of the states to demonstrate that women were benefiting
more than men from rehabilitation to any measurable degree — even though women
were assertedly more susceptible to rehabilitation — could raise doubts about the state's
ability to rehabilitate male and female prisoners, and casts doubt on arty statistical study
proferred by the state to support such a claim,'""
Statutes imposing heavier sentences on males for similar crimes have generally
withstood attack on equal protection grounds. The Illinois Supreme Court in People v.
" See State v. Costello, 59 N.J. 334, 282 A.2d 748 (1971).
9° Id. at 346, 282 A.2d at 755.
9 ' 63 N.J. at 295, 307 A.2d at 82.
92 Id. The court also noted that almost all the witnesses had agreed that no penological reason
justified indeterminate sentencing for women only. Id.
93 Id. at '296, 307 A,2d at 82.
94 Id. at 296-97, 307 A.2d at 82 -83.
95 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
" Id. at 14-17. The court analogized gender-based classifications of women to classifications
made on the basis of race. Id. at 14. Other courts declared the same statute to be unconstitutional
based upon the less stringent rational basis test. See United States ex rel. Sumrell v. York, 288 F. Supp.
955, 956-57 (D. Conn. 1968); Liberti v. York, 28 Conn. Supp. 9, 10-11, 246 A.2d 106, 107 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1968).
" 63 N.J. at 295-96, 307 A.2d at 82.
" Robinson, 281 F. Stipp. at 15-16.
9" Id. at 16.
w° As will he demonstrated in the next section of the article, the absence of rehabilitative results
for women may well be the result of a failure to appropriate necessary resources rather than a failure
of penal theory. See infra text accompanying notes 108-387.
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Boyer,'" for example, held that under either a rational basis or a strict scrutiny test, the
imposition of a heavier penalty upon a male who commits incest with a female child was
justifiable.' 02 The court cited the state's interest in protecting female victims from preg-
nancy and psychological harm as support for its conclusion.'" Another example was the
First Circuit's decision in Wark v. Robbins,'" upholding on equal protection grounds the
constitutionality of a Maine statute that imposed a heavier penalty on males than on
females for escape from prison.'" The court in Wark held that the convicted male
offender failed to meet his burden of proof on the threshold issue of whether males and
females were similarly situated.'" The court, noting the substantial difference in statutory
treatment of security at prisons for males and females, such as the possession of firearms
by guards at male institutions and the heavier penalties imposed on men fo. r assisting
escape, reasoned that the potential for male escape creates a greater risk of harm to others
than does the potential for female escape.'"
An analysis of the cases involving gender-based classifications indicates that gender-
based classifications have not been eliminated in sentencing provisions. Gender-based
classifications are generally held to pass constitutional muster if they relate to physiologi-
cal differences between the sexes or are attempts to protect women from what is per-
ceived to be a greater risk of serious harm.
III. DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN PENAL INSTITUTIONS
Sex-based discrimination in assigning criminal liability and imposing sentences is
coupled with discrimination in correctional institutions. The correctional system has long
been male dominated. The rules, structure, programs, and standard operating proce-
dures of the system were adopted and implemented on the assumption that they were to
be largely applied to male prisoners. The result, however benign and unintentional, has
been the discriminatory treatment of female prisoners. This disparate treatment is evi-
dent in a number of areas in penal institutions. This section of the article will identify the
areas where disparate treatment exists, and will discuss previous attempts to remedy the
disparities. The section of the article that follows will suggest possible solutions to the
problems presented. Discussion of the gender discrimination problems identified will take
'" 63 111. 2d 433, 349 N.E.2d 50 (1976).
1 ° 2 Id. at 436, 349 N.E.2d at 51.
'" Id. at 436, 349 N.E.2d at 51-52.
154 458 F.2d 1295 (1st Cir. 1972).
1°5 Id. at 1295-96, 1299.
106 Id. at 1297-98. Other cases sustaining heavier penalties directed against males include cases
involving an assault statute imposing a maximum two-year sentence on males and a 30-day sentence
on females, see State v. Gurganus, 39 N.C. App. 395, 250 S.E.2d 668 (1979), and the felony murder
rule based upon the commission of a rape wherein rape is only one of the statutorily recognized
classes of criminal sexual conduct, see People v. McDonald 86 Mich. App. 5, 272 N.W.2d 179 (1978).
Again, physiological reasons were given to support the results. Although the assault case purported
to apply the "important government objective" test of Gurganus, it did not rely upon empirical
evidence to establish a greater risk of harm from male assaults nor legislative history to show a clear
intent to protect against this risk. Without such substantiation, the court was simply relying upon a
rational basis test sub silentio. See generally State v. Gurganus, 39 N.C. App. 395, 250 S.E.2d 668
(1979).
In a case that anticipated Craig v. Boren, a Texas court declared that the state could not impose
confinement on seventeen-year-old males convicted of drunk driving when females could only be
subject to a fine for the same offense. Ex parte Tullos, 541 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
107 Wark, 458 F.2d at 1298.
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into account the interrelationship between the specific problem areas and the correctional
process as a whole — an interrelationship often overlooked by analysts keen on eradicat-
ing isolated discriminatory practices.
A. Institutional Designations, Transfers and Classifications Within
the Women's Correctional System
Due to the small number of prison facilities for women, their location, and the
application of programs designed for correctional facilities for men, women are con-
fronted with discriminatory treatment in the designation,'" transfer,'" and classifica-
tion"° phases of incarceration. After sentencing, the most important decision affecting an
offender and the achievement of society's rehabilitative, retributive, incapacitative, or
punitive goals is ordinarily an evaluation regarding the most appropriate correctional
institution and program for each offender."' This decision determines whether an
inmate is placed near to family and friends so that positive relationships can be main-
tained. Although many states maintain several correctional institutions for men in various
locations throughout the state, few have more than one prison for women."' While
prisons for women are generally located in rural areas, 13 male prisoners have a greater
likelihood of being assigned to an institution in an urban area near home, educational,
and vocational opportunities."; Therefore, women are at a disadvantage with respect to
maintaining family relationships and acquiring an education or useful vocational skills
while in prison.
Some slates do not even have in-state prison facilities for women and send their
female prisoners to other states.ns The problems of interstate transfers were exemplified
in State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell.'" The controversy in Maxwell arose because North Dakota
did not then have adequate in-state correctional facilities for women, and the sentencing
Designation is the process through which it is determined to which facility a prisoner will be
assigned.
109
 Transfer refers to the removal of an inmate from one general prison population to another,
or to a restricted population or isolation for either administrative or punitive purposes. See MANUAL
OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS, supra note I, at 360.
10 Classification refers to the determination of the prisoner's program of treatment, training,
employment, care and custody, and, in some instances, the recommendation of a transfer to a more
suitable institution, See MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS, Supra note.!, at 351:
" 1 Designation can be the result of a simple selection process involving limited alternatives or a
sophisticated analysis using information prepared in a pre-sentence analysis report and diagnostic
techniques. In addition, rather than being a product of the correctional system, it may be set as a
condition of a plea bargain. For an indication of the impact of the classification-designation decision
upon inmates, see R. GLICK & V. Nrro, NATIONAL. STUDY OF WOMEN'S CORRECTIONAL PROGRAMS 52
(1977) [hereinafter cited as R. CLicx & V. NETO].
" Fabian, Toward the Best Interests of Women Prisoners: Is the System Working?, 6 NEW ENG. J.
PRISON L. I, 17 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Fabian].
" 3 See R. GI,ICK & V. NETO, supra note 111, at 11-13.
"4
 These locational disadvantages have been partially overcome by greater availability of com-
munity treatment centers. See, e.g., Mo. ADMIN. CODE § 12.02.03; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 504.3
(Corr. Supp. 1979-80); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 460.11 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
Fabian, supra note 112, at 17; see also, Note, The Sexual Segregation of American Prisons, 82 YALE
L.J. 1229, 1233 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Sexual Segregation'.
16 259 N,W.2d 261 (N.D. 1977). A similar result was reached in two lower court cases in the
same state. See State v. Iverson, No. 9138 (N.D. Dist. Ct. March 23, 1973); State v. Wright, No. 9138
(N.D. Dist. Ct. March 23, 1973).
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judge had specified that the defendant could only he incarcerated within state.'" The
state's attorney general sought to have the order set aside because otherwise the defen-
dant would have to be put into permanent protective custody without the benefit of
recreation, work, or other rehabilitative programs the state was unable to provide."' The
North Dakota Supreme Court found that female prisoners assigned to out-of-state in-
stitutions suffered a grievous loss by being denied the same opportunity as male prisoners
to appear in person before the parole board, by having fewer visits from families and
friends, and by having reduced opportunity to confer with counsel." 9 Furthermore, the
court held that the transfer of women prisoners to out-of-state facilities was based upon
sex alone and was inherently suspect under the state constitution.'" The court refused to
accept the lack of state funds as a justification and ordered that the female inmate be sent
to an in-state facility.' 2 ' Execution of this order was postponed until the legislature could
meet to authorize the necessary expenditures.'" In the meantime, out-of-state transfers
were allowed after a hearing.
Since most states have at least one in-state women's correctional facility, the factual
circumstances that gave rise to the issue presented in Maxwell may never materialize
again. The reasoning of Maxwell, however, may still be applicable to instances of out-of-
state transfers of selected prisoners for rehabilitation and training in the absence of
in-state facilities.'' If the absence of facilities is not based on gender, as it was in Maxwell,
no constitutional theory exists to prevent the state from transferring prisoners to out-of-
state facilities, assuming good faith.'"' If the state's failure to provide the facilities is
related to the prisoner's sex, however, then Maxwell may still provide a basis for constitu-
tional attack. The United States Supreme Court in two companion cases, Meachum v.
Fano'' and Montayne v. Haymes,cO rejected constitutional attacks upon the practice of
intrastate transfers, holding that an inmate has no right to be sent to or to remain in a
particular institution that might he more conducive to his or her particular rehabilita-
tion.'" Thus, except for the Maxwell situation, prisoners have no absolute right to be
"7 Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d at 624-25.
Id. at 625.
"9 Id. at 630-31.
120 Id, at 631.
"' Id. at 631-32.
122 la 21632. The court applied a variation of the so-called "Sunburst Rule," derived from Great
Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Company, 287 U.S. 358 (1932), wherein the particular
rule of law derived from the case is not applied to the parties, but prospectively only. 259 N.W.2d at
632.
123 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 77-309 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 50 (1976); ME. REV. STAT ..
ANN. tit. 15, § 295 (1964); MONT. Cony, ANN. § 80-1907 (1983); Nr.v. REV. STAT. §§ 209.300-330
(1974); WYO. STAT. §§ 9-16-160 - 163 (1977).
1 " Transfers as retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right, however, are still subject to
review. See Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2c1 223, 229, 232 (7th Cir. 1973).
125
 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
126 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
717 In Meachum, the Court held that due process does not protect the inmate from being
transferred to another less hospitable institution within the same state. 427 U.S. at 225. In Montayne,
the Court added that a transfer could occur without a hearing even if the inmates' alleged conduct
was the cause for the transfer. 427 U.S. at 242. Lower federal courts and state courts have applied
these decisions to interstate prisoner transfers. See, e.g., Currey-Beg v. Jackson, 422 F. Supp. 926
(D.D.C. 1976); Rehideau v. Stoneman, 398 F. Supp. 805 (D. Vt. 1975); Girourarcl v. Hogan, 135 Vt.
448, 378 A.2d 105 (1977). Where there are state created rights or expectations, however, a hearing is
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incarcerated in a particular prison.
In slates with only one correctional institution for women, the key post-sentencing
decision does not involve the choice of the institution to which to send a prisoner, but
rather the choice of the dormitory or cottage within the prison to which a prisoner should
be assigned. Because of the smaller number of female prisons, prison populations in these
institutions are more heterogeneous than are populations in prisons for men. While men
can be assigned to various prisons based upon the severity of their offense, security risks
or rehabilitative needs, all women are grouped together in one institution regardless of
their needs or problems. Correspondingly, while prisons for men may be designed to deal
with the needs of specific types of prisoners, a correctional institution for women must
provide a broader range of services and programs." 8 Women's facilities have not always
met this challenge. Moreover, a heterogeneous population presents problems for the
classification and separation of female prisoners on the basis of security risk, behavior and
background. While some states have separate maximum, medium, and minimum security
facilities for men, some of the same states house all women, regardless of their security
risk, in the same institution. For many female prisoners the security measures are thus
overly restrictive. 1 =9 Female prisoners have challenged the resulting classification systems
as discriminatory and have argued that such systems turn institutions originally designed
to be rehabilitative into punitive prisons.'
In Canterino v. Wilson,' for example, the District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky was faced with two entirely different classification systems in the Kentucky
correctional system, one for men and one for women. While the system for men rewarded
good behavior, the system for women punished violations of rules by taking away privi-
leges.' 32
 The classification system for women was a behavior modification program' 33
which regulated virtually every aspect of an inmate's prison life including visitation,
personal hygiene, recreation, and other privileges. The system was highly subjective and
not validated by professional testing. 134 The court found that while the stated goals of the
classification system for females were to promote personal growth, a positive attitude, and
socially accepted behavior, the system actually produced the opposite results.' 35 In addi-
tion, female inmates were not evaluated for purposes of security and treatment on the
basis of standard criteria indicating their potential and willingness to adjust to prison
life.' 36
 Rather than controlling troublemakers by isolation and other measures, the entire
required prior to the transfer and reasons must be given for the decision. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at
229.
In states where hearings are required, a woman inmate could assert the presence of special
circumstances that would create a hardship for her, such as the existence of infant children. In such
circumstances, given the wide discretion allowed to prison administrators, see Wakinekona v. Olin,
459 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978), aff 'd , 461 U.S. 238 (1983). the inmate will have to demonstrate a
strong need to remain at the present location to avoid the transfer.
'" Fabian, supra note 112, at 17.
129 Id.
'" See Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Ky. 1982); Barefield v. Leach, Civil No.
10282 (D. N. Mex. 1974), cited in Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1078-79 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
131 546 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
12 Id. at 182, 184.
133 Id. at 180.
'" Id. at 182.
135
	 at 181.
136 Id. at 182.
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female population was subjected to a mandatory system of behavior modification. 137 None
of the prisons for men had a comparable system and no male prisoners were subjected to
a system that restricted the exercise of normal privileges.' 38
In holding that the classification systems in Kentucky unconstitutionally discrimi-
nated against women, the court found that correction officials had either implicitly or
consciously decided that women were less capable than men of handling basic privi-
leges.' 39 Women were restricted from exercising normal privileges while men were not
"because of an exaggerated fear that administrative inconvenience would result if female
inmates were allowed the same modicum of freedom as male inmates . . . . These
restrictions were imposed solely because of gender with the objective of controlling the
lives of women inmates in a way deemed unnecessary for male prisoners."' 40 The court
held that a state policy that presumes that members of one gender suffer from an
inherent handicap or are innately inferior is illegitimate.'" The court found, therefore,
that the classification system, based on gender and unrelated to any important gov-
ernmental objective, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 42
The approach adopted in Canterino is the only approach consistent with constitutional
policy.
B. Constraints Upon the Maintenance of Family Relationships
Maintenance of strong family relationships can foster rehabilitation within the prison
environment and successful reintegration into the community upon release.' 43 Con-
versely, prison procedures that unreasonably curtail visitation and telephone contact
between family members can contribute to future crime because destruction of family
relationships can lessen the incentive for ex-offenders to lead law-abiding lives. Some
evidence indicates that women have a greater need to maintain stable family relationships
than men.'" A recent study indicated that this need is so great that family type relation-
ships develop within women's prisons:
According to a survey of the literature on women's prisons, the majority of
females in prison are members of make-believe families. In the typical family
thus described, inmates play the roles of mother, father, sister, or brother to
each other. The father role generally would be assumed by a masculine-
appearing woman (butch); his wife (femme) would take on the mother role in
"7 Id.
i38 Id. at 180-82.
' 39 Id. at 206-07.
'4° Id. at 207.
'' Id. (citing Hogan v. Mississippi University for Women, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
142 •
.ta For other cases where courts have found classification and reward systems that discrimi-
nate against women unconstitutional, see Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 895 (N.D. Fla.
1976); Barefield v. Leach, Civ. No. 10282 (D. N. Mex. 1974), cited in Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp.
1075, 1078-79 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d 1, 18, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 249.50
(1979); People v. Andrea, 48 Mich. App. 310, 314-15, 210 N.W.2d 474, 477 (1973) (unequal reward
systems would be unconstitutional, although none found here).
143 Maintenance of an inmates ties with the family has been shown to be the most important
factor in successful reintegration. See N. HOLT AND D. MILLER, EXPLANATIONS IN INMATE FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS 61 (1972) (published by the California Department of Corrections, Research Divi-
sion).
144 Id. at 61-62.
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relation to several other, perhaps younger•inmates. The parent fulfills the
desire to nurture; the child has her need to be nurtured fulfilled' . . . family
membership are the norm in institutions that are, exclusively fernale.195
The location of institutions and the institutions' visitation procedures also contribute
to imprisonment having a disproportionate impact on the family relationships of women
as compared to those of men. "6 Often institutions for women are located in remote areas
where the female inmates have more limited access to family, friends and attorneys than
the access available to male inmates who can he incarcerated near their home com-
munities.H 7
 Visitation procedures can foster family relationships. Family relationships are
difficult to maintain, however, when visitation procedures prevent contact visits" 9 by
placing a screen or glass partition between family members. Elimination of contact visits is
administratively desirable since security concerns often mandate strip and cavity searches
after each outside contact. This procedure is time consuming and often requires addi-
tional correctional staff. Similarly, short visiting hours tend to discourage visits by rela-
tives who have to travel long distances. Restrictions on the use of telephones similarly
prevent maintenance of strong family relationships.
Attempts by both male and female prisoners to maintain family relationships have
resulted in considerable litigation, with different outcomes. While it is generally recog-
nized that prisoners do not have an absolute right to see visitors,' 49 courts differ as to how
much deference should be given to administrative regulations on this issue. In reality,
prison officials' decisions are accorded great deference by the courts in the scheduling of
visits and the type of visitors permitted.
Denial of contact visits has been frequently challenged on constitutional grounds with
varying results. 15° The Supreme Court in Block v. Rutherford ' 5 ' recently stated that security
interests outweigh the family's right to contact visits.'" The Court's decision accorded
great deference to the security concerns reflected in the visitation policies of professional
correctional officials.'" Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stated that policies restrict-
ing contact visits must be reasonably related to security interests.'" The Court found that
Los Angeles County's blanket prohibition of contact visits was "an entirely reasonable,
15 Van Wormer, Social Function of Prison Families: The Female Solution, 91 PSYCH. LAW 181, 182
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Van Wormer].
146 See Comment, Women's Prisons: Laboratories for Penal Reform, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 210, 221 -22.
See generally R. GLICK & V. NETO, supra note 111. ,
H T L. CRITES, THE FEMALE OFFENDERS 123-24 (1976) [hereinafter cited as L. CRITES].
' 46 Contact visits occur when a prisoner is visited by an individual from outside the prison
population and prison staff. These visits are face to face and actual physical contact is allowed, thus
creating the possibility that weapons or other forbidden items could be given to the prisoner.
"9 See, e.g., Wojtczak v. Cuyler, 480 F. Supp. 1288 (E.D. Pa. 1979); In re Carrafa, 77 Cal. App. 3d
788, 793, 143 Cal. Rptr. 848, 851 (1978). But see Valentine v. Englehardt, 474 F. Supp. 294 (D. N.J.
1979) (denial of visitation rights to inmate's children unconstitutional)•
` 50 See, e.g. Moore v. Janning, 426 F. Supp. 464, 467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (where the court held
that denial of contact visits was not unconstitutional). But see Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v.
Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 758-59 (3d Cir. 1979); White v. Keller, 588 F.2d 913, 914 (4th Cir. 1978); Bono
v. Saxbe, 450 F. Supp. 934, 947 (E.D. III. 1978) (where prison security has been considered as a
justifiable basis for refusing to allow contact only between pre-trial detainees and visitors).
' 5 ' 104 S. Ct. 3227 (1984).
'Si Id. at 3232, 3233.
' 53 Id. at 3232.
154 Id.
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non-punitive response to legitimate security concerns, consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment." 155
In spite of the uncertainties as to what visitation restrictions are constitutionally
permissible, denial to women of the same visiting privileges that are given to men
constitutes a violation of equal protection unless there is a substantial government interest
to be protected.'" The court in Canterino v. Wilson, for example, found that female
prisoners in Kentucky were denied equal protection by state policies that allowed male
prisoners twice as much visitation time as female prisoners and that allowed men unlim-
ited access to telephone calls during free time while allowing women no more than fifteen
minutes per month for telephone calls.'" The Canterino court held that to the extent that
the correctional system imposed restrictions on female inmates in the exercise of privi-
leges routinely allowed to male inmates that could be accorded all prisoners without
compromising legitimate correctional needs, the system violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. According to the court, the restrictions on the
exercise of normal privileges do not serve any important governmental function and
therefore can not withstand constitutional scrutiny.' 58
Budgetary considerations and physical protection of female inmates were rejected in
Molar v. Gates as adequate justifications for denying female inmates an equal right to
contact visits.'" While male inmates in county jails could have contact visits, the female
inmates in Molar were separated from their visitors by a glass partition so that they could
not touch their visitors or hold infants.''
C. Incarceration and Its Effect on Parental Rights
For female offenders the greatest constraints of incarceration are both the potential
for termination of parental rights and the limited contact with their children.' 61 In this
respect, imprisonment has a disproportionately greater effect on women than on men.
One study found that "the role of mother is more crucial for the mother herself than is
the father's role to him, and ... her separation from her children, and the concomitant
major change in her role, more directly strike at her essential personal identity and her
self-image as a woman."' Recent analysis by institutions engaged in sociological gender
l's Id. at 3234.
Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
'" Id. at 184, 201.
m Id. at 207. In citing to Hogan v. Mississippi University for Women, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982),
the court was applying the principles and test established in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
'" 98 Cal. App. 3d I, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239 (4th Dist. 1979).
1" Id. at 10, 27, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 244, 253.
' 6 ' Id, at 7-8, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 242-43.
' 52 See K. GABEL, THE LEGAL ISSUES OF FEMALE INMATES 2-3, 51-88 (1982) (printed by the School
for Social Work, Smith College and National Institute of Corrections) [hereinafter cited as K. GABEL]
for survey results indicating that the primary concern of female inmates with children is over custody
and family issues.
As this article was being readied for publication, the American Correctional Association released
a new work dealing with the issue of inmates and parental responsibilities. See generallyj. BOLMOURIS,
PRISONS AND KIDS, PROGRAMS FOR INMATE PARENTS (American Correctional Association 1985).
' 65 L. CRITES, supra note 147, at 101 (quoting S. FALBA, WOMEN PRISONERS AND THEIR FAMILIES
(1968)).
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research concluded that the enforced emotional detachment' 64 of male prisoners is less
severe because a father generally has less of an emotional bond to his children and
because he often leaves a wife behind to care for them.I 65 Recent studies also indicate that
between sixty and eighty percent of incarcerated females have children and approxi-
mately half of the inmate mothers are the sole supporters of their children.' 66 While
inmate fathers can depend on their children's mother to care for their children, most
inmate mothers must rely on someone other than the father to care for their children.
One study revealed that eighty percent of the inmate mothers left their children with
their mothers upon incarceration.' 67 Maintenance of the parent-child relationship is not
only an important factor in the rehabilitation and mental health of the female inmate,'"
but it is also crucial to the development and maturation of their children.' 69 Despite the
importance of maintaining strong family relationships, many correctional institutions for
women have not established adequate programs for maintaining such relationships,"°
while some institutions even have procedures that discourage visitation."' Furthermore,
most correctional institutions have not adopted provisions for pregnant women or for
women with newborn children. 17 "
Termination of parental rights is traumatic for both the child and the parent. 173
Although most statutes dealing with the termination of parental rights do not specify
imprisonment as an automatic ground for termination of these rights, there are some
state statutes that do so specify, thereby imposing punishment additional to incarceration
for the commission of a crime. 174
 These latter statutes create a presumption of unfitness
due to the inability of a parent to perform parental duties. These statutes do not take into
' 64
 Enforced emotional detachment describes the situation occuring when incarceration in a
correctional institution results in severance of the parent-child relationship both physically and
emotionally.
' 65 Note, Mothers Behind Bars: A Look at Parental Rights of Incarcerated Women, 4 NEW ENG. J. OF
PRISON L. 141, 142-43 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Mothers Behind Bars].
lm Id. at 142-43 & n.53. See generally Female Offenders Problems and Programs, FEMALE OFFENDER
RESOURCE CENTER, NATIONAL OFFENDER SERVICE COORDINATION PROGRAM, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION (1976); MCGOWAN AND BLUMENTHAL, WHY PUNISH THE CHILDREN? A STUDY OF WOMEN
PRISONERS (1978) (published by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency).
I" R. GLICK & V. NETO, supra note 111, at 119 cited in Mothers Behind Bars, supra note 165, at 143
n.10. See also Haft, Women in Prison: Discriminatory Practices and Some Legal Solutions, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 1, 4 n.27 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Haft]. Another study revealed that female inmates had an
average of 2.43 children as compared to 1.3 for males. Sack, Seidler & Thomas, The Children of
Imprisoned Parents: A Psychosocial Exploration, 46 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 618 (1974), cited in
Mothers Behind Bars, supra note 165, at 143.
'" K. GABEL, supra note 162, at 86.
"‘` Rippon and Hassell, Women, Prison and the Eighth Amendment, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 434, 448
(1981); Van Wormer, supra note 145, at 181.
176 See Note, On Prisoners and Parenting: Preserving the Tie that Binds, 87 YALE L.J. 1408 (1978) for
an analysis of the parent-child bond and the effects of current prison practices on children.
' 7 ' A 1974 survey of 81 federal and state prisons revealed that 39 institutions did not have any
programs for the inmates' children. CRIME AND DELINQUENCY LITERATURE, SUMMARY REPORT ON
PRISON NURSERY STUDY COMMITTEE 36 (1975).
'" L. CRITES, supra note 147, at 101, 121-24.
173
 Research has shown that the early years of a child's life are critical to the formation of that
child's personality and intellect. The mother plays an indispensable role in her child's growth. In its
present form, however, incarceration makes it virtually impossible for an imprisoned mother to
provide the support necessary for the child's satisfactory development. See generally J. BECK, How TO
RAISE A BRIGHTER CHII.D 161 (1975).
'74
 Haft, supra note 167, at 1, 4 n.6.
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account that such inability is proximately caused by the rules of the incarcerating institu-
tion, which prevent a child from being with the parent, rather than by the parent's
voluntary abandonment of the child. 15
 In the absence of an express legislative mandate,
many state courts have equated incarceration with abandonment of the child and there-
fore consider it an event for which parental rights can be terminated.'" The courts use a
parens patriae concept to find the power to decide whether or not parental rights are to
be terminated.'" Although this concept has recently fallen into relative disfavor,'" its
vestiges remain to clothe the courts with a power that has particularly invidious effects on
the incarcerated mother. In most instances an incarcerated mother is replaced by a child
care agency that seeks to provide the guidance, support, and care of the absent mother.
The child care agency often places the mother under tremendous legal and psychological
pressure to put the child up for adoption. An incarcerated mother who succumbs to this
pressure is denied an important element in her process of rehabilitation — the existence
of family ties, which can make the time spent incarcerated less emotionally damaging and
concomitantly provide a greater incentive to obtain an early release and a successfully
completed parole. Both child care agencies and courts in this country, faced with issues
arising out of the incarceration of a parent, have generally focused only on the best
interests of the children.' This focus has necessarily resulted in the subordination of
parental rights in favor of the child's welfare."°
Despite the derogation of a prisoner's parental rights, the concept of parenthood as a
fundamental right has been reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court.' 81
 The
Court's recognition of the tension existing between parental rights and conflicting state
policy is illustrated by the Court's decision in In re Millar . 182 In Millar, the mother had a
long history of mental illness and lived alone with her child. In an effort to prevent the
mother from possibly causing harm to the child without radically interfering with the
parental relationship, the Court affirmed a lower court. order finding that the mother had
neglected her child, but granted the mother custody subject to one year's probation.'
Although this situation is clearly distinguishable from that of an incarcerated mother, the
policy behind Millar can be instructive when attempting to strike a balance between
parental rights, child needs, and correctional goals, which seek to rehabilitate the of-
fender, foster a healthy sense of responsibility, and maintain family relationships.
The California legislature, recognizing the dual nature of this problem, enacted a
statute" that permits any woman incarcerated in that state who has a child under two
years of age, or gives birth to a child while incarcerated, to keep her child until its second
'" See, e.g., ALASKA SrAT. § 20.10.040 (1962); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.040 (1961).
176 See, e.g., In re Jacques, 48 N.J. Super. 523, 138 A.2d 581 (1958).
In See Kleenfield, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and The State (pt. 3) 5 FAM.
L.Q. 64, 66 -71 (1971).
'" See Ketcham & Babcock, Statutory Standards for the Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 29
Ru'rciERs L. REv. 530, 534.36 (1976).
179
 Comment, The Prisoner Mother and Her Child, 1 CAP. U.L. REV. 127, 129 (1972).
'" Id. at 130.
' 81 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1971). in Stanley the Court held that depriving unwed
fathers of custody of their children violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the
United States Constitution. Id. at 658.
182
 40 A,D.2d 637, 336 N.Y.S.2d 144 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972) (per curiam).
183 Id. at 638, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 145-46.
'81
	 PENAL CODE § 3401 (Deering 1971).
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birthday, or longer if the situation permits.'" This position, although an ideal initial step
toward solving the problem, has been slow to gain acceptance in other jurisdictions)"
The reason for this lack of acceptance seems to be a combination of administrative
convenience and legislative short-sightedness. Current child-psychological thought indi-
cates that the care a child should receive for adequate development need not originate
from the biological parent.'" This concept is highly amenable to situations of parental
incarceration — it provides a psychological justification for what is, in essence, a judicially
easy resolution of difficult issues.
The majority of states have not embraced the California model and each state's
statute differs according to how its courts interpret the statute's construction and em-
phasis. While most states place the emphasis on the welfare of the child, some states
continue to focus on parental rights. In Minnesota, for example, the state's highest court
in In re Welfare of Scott, 188 addressed the issue of whether the offense committed was severe
enough to justify termination of the offender's parental rights.'" In Scott, the putative
father was involved in a car chase after the mother and child that resulted in his shooting
and killing the mother and injuring the child.'" The court specifically stated that it was
not the subsequent imprisonment but rather the father's violent conduct that justified the
termination of his parental rights under the Minnesota statute. 19 ' Reasoning that the
violent propensities of the father's personality placed the physical and psychological
well-being of the child in jeopardy, the court mandated the termination of his parental
rights.'"
An opposite result under similar facts was reached by a New Jersey court in the case
In re Adoption of J. fry J. and A. ' 93 In that case the father was convicted of stabbing the
mother to death.'" While the father was incarcerated and awaiting trial, his wife's family
assumed custody of the child,'" After the father's conviction, the wife's family filed
adoption proceedings.'96 The lower court found that the father's criminal record alone
was inadequate grounds for termination, but that the nature of his crime disqualified him
on an abandonment theory.'" On this rationale, the "best interests of the child" test was
applied and the adoption was approved. 198 The New Jersey Supreme Court, however,
reversed the lower court's decision on the grounds that the jailing did not necessarily
evidence a forsaking of parental rights and obligations under the terms of the New Jersey
statute,'" and was not indicative of the father's future capacity to resume his parental
Id.
' 86 For cases stating that incarceration alone is not enough to establish abandonment, see, e.g.,
Diernfeld v. People, 137 Colo. 238, 240, 323 P.2d 628, 631 (1958); In re Welfare of Staat, 287 Minn.
501, 506, 178 N.W.2d 709, 713 (1970); State v: Grade, 231 Or. 65, 67, 371 P.2d 68, 69 (1962).
' 67 See GOLDSTEIN, FREUD SC SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 16-21 (1973).
309 Minn, 458, 244 N.W.2d 669 (1976).
'" Id. at 459, 244 N.W.2d at 671-72.
'"" Id. at 462, 244 N.W.2d at 671-72.
' 61 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.221(b)(4) (West 1982).
1" Scott, 309 Minn, at 461, 244 N.W.2d at 671.
'" 139 N.J. Super. 533, 354 A.2d 662 (1976), rev'd, 73 N.J. 68, 372 A.2d 607 (1977).
1" Id. at 537, 354 A.2d at 662-63.
u's Id. at 537-38, 354 A.2d at 663.
196
 Id. at 538, 354 A.2d at 663.
'" Id. at 545, 354 A.2d at 665-66.
199 Id. at 545-46, 354 A.2d at 666.
'" N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:3-24 (West 1976) (repealed 1977).
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obligations." The inconsistency of these decisions can he reconciled by realizing that the
Minnesota court focused upon the best interests of the child, while the New Jersey
Supreme Court applied that state's statute in a manner more likely to protect the rights of
the parent where the child was not immediately threatened with harm."' The New Jersey
approach is fairly typical of the standard used to judge whether or not abandonment has
occurred after incarceration."' Where the parent has made custodial arrangements for
the child's care and has attempted to contact the child on a regular basis during incarcera-
tion, abandonment usually will not be found."
One of the factors a reviewing court may take into account in deciding whether to
terminate parental rights is the ability of the parent to support the child materially upon
release. This ability can be enhanced by an adequate prison vocational program. Such
programs are often either unavailable or limited for the women prisoners. This limitation
adversely affects the chances for an incarcerated mother to retain custody of her child, as
it prevents her from significantly upgrading her marketable skills to a level that would
satisfy a reviewing child-care authority. The net effect is to leave an incarcerated mother
in a position much more likely to be deemed "abandonment" than would be the case with
an incarcerated father.
The entire abandonment issue, however, would and should be moot if more states
adopted the California approach to child custody in prison. In New York, for example,
the policy of recognizing the importance of a strong parent-child relationship"' has
resulted in a statutory approach similar to the California approach," Because current
theories of corrections are founded upon the concepts of reformation and not Talionic
justice,' the California approach is a positive step because it reduces the spectre of
additional punishment for women with children while increasing the incentive for, and
the likelihood of the successful rehabilitation of women prisoners."
D. Vocational Training
Successful reintegration of offenders depends in part upon providing education and
training programs that teach the skills necessary for obtaining gainful employment upon
release. Such programs are often considered rehabilitative in nature. For many inmates,
however, these programs are strictly habilitative, because they have never had employ-
ment skills. Many women's institutions do not offer the training nor do they have the
resources to support the programs to the same extent as male prisons.
Although the movement toward creating a rehabilitative environment and programs
200 The court reversed the lower court in a per curiam decision, "substantially for the reasons
expressed in the dissenting opinion of Judge Crahay" of the lower court. Adoption of J., 73 N.J. at 68,
372 A.2d at 607. See 139 N.J. Super. at 546-48, 354 A.2d at 668-69 (Crahay, J., dissenting).
20 ' Id. Compare Scott, 309 Minn. at 461-62, 244 N.W.2d at 671-72, with Adoption of J., 73 N.J. at 68,
372 A.2d at 607 (adopting dissenting opinion of lower court, 139 N.J. Super. at 546-48, 354 A.2d at
668-69 (Crahay, J., dissenting)).
2°7 This standard is obviously not used by those courts which equate incarceration with aban-
donment.
203 In re T.M.R., 41 Cal. App. 3d 694, 698-700, 116 Cal. Rptr. 292, 294-95 (1974).
2°' See Apgar v. Beauten, 75 Misc. 2d 439, 442, 347 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
203 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 1968), that permits a newborn to stay with its
mother in jail or in prison subject only to requirement that the mother be physically fit to care for
infant.
200 See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. I, § 15.
2°7 State v. Grady, 231 Or. 65, 371 P.2d 68 (1962).
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may have originated in correctional institutions for women,' recent studies indicate that
vocational and educational programs for men far outnumber programs provided for
women.'" While men's prisons tend to offer programs in fields such as welding, auto
repair, electronics, construction, television repair, tailoring and plumbing, women's pris-
ons offer training in the substantially less financially rewarding areas of housekeeping,
cosmetology, food service, nurses' aid, and secretarial training. 210
 Although such areas are
consistent with the interests of some female inmates, a recent survey of female prisoners
in an Illinois facility revealed that the top twelve vocational areas of interest in descending
order were child care center aid, key punch operator, nurses' aid, typist, cosmetologist,
computer programmer, data processor, medical or dental assistant, photographer, cloth-
ing designer, cashier, and correctional or parole officer. 2 " Despite such interests, some
women's prisons offer no vocational training. 212
A number of reasons have been cited to justify the lack of vocational programs for
women. First, many women who are interested in such programs lack sufficient education
to qualify for them, 2 ' 3 and prison education programs are often inadequate.' Second,
vocational choices are limited by the small size of women's correctional prisons. Third,
correctional institutions for women located in rural areas are not as able to compensate
for the lack of institutional programs through the use of community-based vocational
training as are male institutions located in urban areas. Fourth, the short duration of
incarceration of most prisoners prevents many inmates from completing training pro-
grams. Unless there is a high degree of coordination between institutional programs and
community based programs, the institutional training is wasted. To complete training
programs and obtain employment, inmates need community assistance in continuing the
training programs at a suitable location upon release.
Although prisoners in general do not have a constitutional right to receive vocational
training, 215 female prisoners have brought actions on equal protection grounds because of
the disparity in the vocational programs available to female inmates as compared with the
programs offered male inmates. In Canterino v. Wilson , 216 the court compared four aspects
of vocational education and training and found gross disparities in the quality and
2" Fahian,supra note 112, at 3-6; Sorensen, Educational and Vocational Needs of Women in Prisons,
in CORRECTIONS TODAY 62 (May-June 1981) and references cited therein [hereinafter cited as
Sorensen].
2" A 1973 national survey found that men's prisons had an average of 10.2 vocational training
programs per institution compared with an average of 2.7 programs for women in prisons. Note,
Sexual Segregation, supra note 115, at 1243 n.80.
'E° Id. at 1241-43, 1269-73. For more recent similar findings, see K. GABEL, supra note 162, at
82-83.
2" Sorensen, supra note 208, at 66.
2 " For example, in a study of four prisons for Women in the northeast, seventy-three percent of
the inmates were receiving no training. K. GABEL, supra note 162, at 83-84.
213
	 Female Offenders: A Challenge to the Courts and the Legislature, 51	 REV. 827, 838
(1975).
24 K. GABEL, supra note 162, at 43, 84. A survey of four prisons in the northeast revealed that
most female inmates believed that the education available was poor or very poor. Id. at 84.
2 " See, e.g., Padgett v. Stein, 406 F. Supp. 287, 296 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (no duty to rehabilitate
inmates); Russell v. Oliver, 392 F. Supp. 470, 474 (W.D. Va. 1975) (no inmate right to vocational
materials); James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177, 1180 (M.D. Ala. 1974); cf. Smith v. Schneckloth, 414
F.2d 680, 682 (9th Cir. 1969) (failure of State to provide rehabilitation and vocational training for
narcotics addict does not violate eighth amendment).
"8 546 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
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quantity of programs available for men and women in the Kentucky correctional sys-
tem." The four areas included vocational school courses within the institutions, prison
industries and farms, on-the-job training, and community-based programs. 78
 While
women had access to only two institutional training courses, business office education, and
upholstery, men had access to fourteen different trades including auto body, carpentry,
drafting, masonry, plumbing, printing, radio and television repair, welding, upholstery,
air conditioning repair, small engine repair, meat cutting, and electrical repair.' In
addition, the programs for men were full time, while women trained part time.'" Not a
single prison industry was available to women prisoners, while male prisoners had jobs
making garments, furniture, printing, recapping tires, repairing automobiles, and mak-
ing soap.'" Similarly, the range of on-the-job training available to women was less
extensive than the range of opportunities available to men."' Community-based voca-
tional training release programs were available only to male inmates.'"
After determining that female prisoners in Kentucky received substantially less
vocational education and training than men, the court examined whether the disparate
treatment of female inmates was substantially related to an important government objec-
tive."'" In its defense, the State of Kentucky asserted that the difference in treatment was
based upon size, needs, interests, and security.'" The court, however, following the
decision in Glover v. johnson,' 23 held that institutional size and a state's desire to preserve
limited resources cannot be used to justify an allocation of those limited resources that
unfairly denies women equal access to programs routinely available to men. 227 In consid-
ering Kentucky's argument, the court found that the needs of female prisoners for
vocational training and education were at least as great as the needs of male prisoners.""
Similarly, the court noted that test results showed that female prisoners had a high
interest in vocational training." Finally, the court held that the security interests put
forth by the state were insufficient. to justify the disparate provision of vocational pro-
grams.'131 The disparate treatment of female prisoners was not, therefore, substantially
related to ar, important governmental objective."'
In holding in favor of the female complainants, the court found that by providing
grossly unequal vocational opportunities to men and women, the State of Kentucky had
217 Id.
21"Id.
215 Id. at 188-96.
220 Id.
521 Id. at 191 -93.
222 Id. at 193-97.
"3 Id. at 188-96.
22 ' Id. at 211-12 (citing Hogan v. Mississippi University for Women, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25
(1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
220 Id. at 211 .
22"478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979). In Glover, the female plaintiffs claimed that the state
had violated their constitutional rights by offering educational and vocational rehabilitation oppor-
tunities substantially inferior to opportunities offered male prisoners. The district court held that
while it is neither feasible nor wise to require identical treatment of male and female inmates by the
state, the constitution requires a greater degree of parity in rehabilitation programming.
227 Canierino, 546 F. Supp. at 211 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220-25 (1982)),
228
 Id. at 211-12.
22" Id. at 212.
2" Id.
231 Id.
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violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and several federal
statutes."' The court further held that the equal protection clause requires parity, not
identity, of treatment for female prisoners in the area of jobs, vocational education and
training. This standard, the court concluded, could be met in any way that made available
to women opportunities substantially equivalent "in substance if not form" to oppor-
tunities accorded men.'"
E. Work Release and Vocational Training Release
Female inmates have been denied the opportunity to participate in valuable work
release'34 and vocational training release programs.'" These programs are important
features in correctional programming because they are considered effective means of
promoting reintegration."'" Inmates who are given the opportunity to obtain training and
work outside the prison walls are more able to adjust to final release"' and develop better
self-images while incarcerated than inmates forced to stay within the institution. Pro-
grams allowing prisoners access to the outside world tend to reduce the costs of incarcera-
tion since the released inmates are often housed at less costly "halfway houses." Partici-
pants are usually required to contribute to program administration costs, room and
board, and are able to provide support for dependents, thereby lessening their reliance
upon public support via welfare.'" In spite of the tangible and intangible benefits of such
programs, however, they are not operated at most women's correctional facilities. A
recent survey of fourteen state correctional facilities revealed that only two percent of the
prison population and one percent of the jail population at women's institutions partici-
pated in work release programs.'"
732 Id. at 209-12. The federal statutes included 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982) (education); Com-
prehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-203, § 132, added by Pub. L. No.
95-524, § 2, 92 Stat. 1948 (1978), repealed by Job Training Partnership Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-300, § 184(a)(1), 96 Stat. 1357 (1982); The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)(1) (1982). All of these statutes prohibited states from discriminating against
women through the allocation of federally received grant funds.
233 Canterino, 546 F. Supp. at 210. The concept of "parity of treatment" in correctional institu-
tions had been put forth previously in Barefield v. Leach, Civil No. 10282 (D.N.M. 1974), cited in
Clover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1078-79 (E.D. Mich. 1979). In both Barefield,  involving the
New Mexico correctional system, and Glover, involving the Michigan correctional system, female
inmates had substantially less access than men to vocational training programs. New Mexico had less
justification for the disparate treatment because the women's prison was adjacent to the men's
institut ion.
"' The terms "work release" or "work furlough program" refer to correctional programs
allowing inmates to leave an institution for the purpose of continuing regular employment during
the daytime, but requiring the inmates to report back to lockup nights and weekends. See MANUAL of
CORRECTIONAL. STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 17.
233
 A release program, as a pre-release tool, provides an opportunity to individuals who, in the
judgment of the departmental screening committee, need further transitional preparation for
community life. MANUAL OF CORRECTMNAL STANDARDS, Supra note 1, at 17.
233
 Although there is little empirical evidence that work release programs lower recidivism later,
correctional officials maintain their belief in their benefits. See Note, Denial of Work Release Programs to
Women: A Violation of Equal Protection, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1457 n.27 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Work Release].
237 Id.
233 Id. at 1457 n.30.
233 R. GiAcx & V. NaTO, supra note 111, at 84-85.
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If this sample is representative of the entire country, there is just cause for question-
ing why work release programs have not been made more widely available to women
inmates. Correctional administrators have offered numerous reasons to justify this situa-
tion including the bald assertion that women do not benefit from work release. Some
administrators claim that women do not need rehabilitation while others state that women
need more rehabilitation than men and that work release is incapable of meeting their
greater needs:m0 Another highly suspect justification is that women prisoners do not have
dependents to support and thus their economic need is less than the need of male
inmates. 2" The most common objection to women's work release programs is that these
programs are not efficient uses of the limited funds allocated to correction because the
administrative problems and expenses are disproportionately high.
The issue of the unavailability of vocational training and work release was addressed
in Canterino v. Wilson . 242 The Canterino court found that women in the Kentucky correc-
tional system were denied access to all three forms of vocational training release that were
available to men: vocational training release, gradual release, and expedient release."'
Vocational training release was a program created by statute which allowed prisoners to
reside at county jails during the last ninety days of confinement so that they could search
for jobs or attend vocational training schools in the area where they would be released."'
Gradual release served the same purpose as the vocational training release program but
was restricted to male prisoners with parole dates.' Expedient release allowed prisoners
with parole dates to be released early if they had employment and home plans confirmed
by letter,-46
In finding that Kentucky discriminated against female prisoners by not providing
these programs for women, the Canterino court concluded that the state had violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."' The same rationale was used in
Glover v. johnson,"8 where another federal district court held that women were constitu-
tionally entitled to participate in work release programs available to men." 9 In Glover, all
eligible female inmates of Michigan correctional institutions could be placed at commu-
nity treatment centers." S 0 Placement at a community treatment center enabled the inmates
to find a job and continue to hold it for as long as they wished, even past their release
date."' Male inmates could also qualify for placement in community treatment centers,
but only a limited number could be accommodated. Male inmates who could not be
accommodated participated in "work pass" programs. Work pass is a program wherein
inmates are released to local employment during the day and return to the institution at
night. Women inmates objected to placement only at the community treatment centers
2" Note, Work Release, supra note 236, at 1459.
24 ' Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174 (1982).
242
 Id. at 196.
243 Id. at 188.
294
	 at 196.
243 Id.
244
 Id. at 196, 209-12.
24 ' Id. at 207. Note that the Canterino court also found violations of two separate federal statutes.
Id.
24 ' 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979). See also Green v. Koch, Civil No. 4402 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
where the City of New York agreed to open community-based work release programs to women.
249 478 F. Supp. at 1083-87.
2" Id. at 1086.
"t Id. at 1092.
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because they considered it to be a "less desirable alternative" than work pass. The female
prisoners argued that some of the community treat ment centers were located in undesir-
able areas, that their regulations were onerous, and that minor infractions would jeopar-
dize the inmates' chances for release. 252 The defendant, head of the Michigan Depart-
ment of Corrections, on the other hand, testified that his department preferred the use of
community treatment centers since the inmates had the opportunity to develop economic
sufficiency as welt as to readjust to life in the community. This latter benefit was unavail-
able to inmates required to return to the institution each evening. 253
 The court decided
that both types of programs were valuable and that there was no reason to deny women
the alternatives available to men. 2" The state of Michigan had admitted that placement of
women at community treatment centers was highly desirable; its only argument against
work pass for women was that it was "less desirable."25 The court did not consider this
distinction to he an important enough governmental interest to justify disparate treat-
men t." 5"
The state in Glover did not raise any of the reasons usually mentioned by correctional
administrators for not implementing work release at their institution, which include
concerns about security, smuggling of contraband, transportation and potential for es-
cape.'" A strong argument can be made that these reasons all relate to costs and are not
particularly convincing since work release programs are self-supporting. 2" Furthermore,
the court in Glover indicated that economic considerations alone would not justify official
inaction or unwillingness to operate the prison in a constitutional manner. 2" In the future
it will not he worth while to litigate cases like Glover since the court made it very clear that
economic and administrative convenience arguments will not pass constitutional muster.
Another case upholding the right of women inmates to have access to work release
programs was Molar v. Gates. "0 Molar arose out of the California practice of sending all
female inmates to the same facility while allowing some males to be sent to minimum
security institutions where work release was available. 26 i The Molar court found this
”2 Id. at 1093.
'" Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1093.
2ss
25t1 Id. at 1092-93.
'57 See Note, Work Release, supra note 236, at 1460.
21'8 Id.
259 Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1078. A similar approach was taken by the court in Dawson v.
Carberry, No. C-71-1916 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 17, 1972) when the state asserted that higher costs made
the program uneconomic. The case is particularly significant since it relied upon the minimum
scrutiny test of Reed v. Reed. See also Canterino, 546 F. Supp. at 195-96, 209-12 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (the
court found that the disparity in access to work release programs violated the female prisoners' equal
protection rights).
"° 98 Cal. App. 3d I, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1979).
251 Id. at 6, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 243-44. In State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621 (N.D.
1977), the court refused to permit the state to transfer female inmates out of state to facilities where
work release and other programs were available. Id. at 631-32. Maxwell thus supports the holding in
Molar that the states should make their programs available on an equal opportunity basis. See also
Green v. Koch, Civil No. 79-4402 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (complaint) wherein the plaintiff's alleged that the
city violated their civil rights, contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by failing to operate a women's
correctional facility at which they could have participated in work release and other programs.
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practice to be violative of that state's constitution and of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amen dment. 262
Given the acceptance of work release by correctional administrators as a desirable
program, courts are presented with an easy decision if this kind of program is im-
plemented only in men's institutions. In such a situation the court is not faced with the
dilemma of evaluating competing alternatives under a parity of treatment standard
because the program is either in effect or not in effect. Thus, the impact of the few
reported decisions in this area is greater than in most of the others discussed in this
article, where administrative discretion is pervasive." 63 In the area of work release and
vocational training, however, courts have uniformly instructed correctional adminis-
trators to provide female prisoners the same opportunities provided to male prisoners.
F. Recreation
In spite of the progress made in offering recreational opportunities in prison sys-
tems, female prisoners have been forced in several instances to sue for parity of recrea-
tional opportunity. Suits to increase recreational opportunities can be based upon eighth
amendment claims of cruel and unusual punishment,'" fourteenth amendment equal
protection arguments,'- 65 or on state statutory grounds. Cruel and unusual punishment
claims can be based upon medical and penological evidence that a lack of recreation, fresh
air and outdoor activity is harmful to the mental and physical well being of inmates.'"
Inadequate recreational activity deprives inmates of the opportunity to "blow off steam
and excess energy," thereby increasing tension and threatening prison security as well as
personal physical and psychological well-being.""
Most of the cases brought by female inmates over recreational issues are equal
protection challenges based upon allegatiims that male prisoners have vastly superior
opportunities for recreation. In Canterino v. Wilson, 268 the court compared recreational
opportunities in the Kentucky correctional systems and found that "men at the most
restrictive male institution have more access to the outdoors in one day than women . .
'have in a normal week."'" The court held that the state must provide women inmates
with recreational and outdoor activities "substantially equal" to recreational opportunities
offered male prisoners."" Inconsistent with Canterino is the decision in Cooper v. Morin,"'
where the court denied the gender based equal protection claims of female inmates even
though male inmates had access to gymnasium facilities over twice as many hours per
week as female inmates." 72 The court reasoned that male inmates outnumbered females
ma Molar, 98 Cal. App. 3d at 10-11, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 249-51. The court relied upon an earlier
interpretation of the California Constitution that sex was a suspect classification. See Sailer Inn v.
Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 17-19, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339-41 (1971).
263 A court ordered work release program may itself have a broader effect by alleviating the lack
of vocational programs traditionally characteristic at women's institutions.
264 See Cooper v. Morin, 398 N.Y.S.2d 36, 78 (1977) and cases cited therein.
26u
	 Canterino, 546 F. Supp. at 215.
See Cooper, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 78-79.
267 See id. at 79.
266 546 F. Supp. at 202.
26° Id, at 201-02.
2" Id. at 201-02, 215.
27 ' 398 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
272 id.
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by approximately ten to one and there was a higher participation level for men.""
The typical reasons put forth by correctional officials to justify disparities in recrea-
tional opportunities for men and women are lack of financial resources and security. 274
Such reasons have been rightfully rejected." 75 For example, in Bukhari v. Hutto,"6 the
court held that the fourteenth amendment requires that any sex-based disparity serve
important governmental objectives and be substantially related to achieving such objec-
tives. 277
 While the court sympathized with the government's argument that providing a
wide range of programs for a smaller number of prisoners at a female prison entails a
financial burden, it emphasized that budgetary considerations cannot be used to justify
official or legislative unwillingness to operate a prison in a constitutional manner. 178
Furthermore, the court concluded that, while security at a prison may justify provision of
different opportunities-for men and women, the equal protection clause requires parity
of treatment.'" Similarly, in Molar v. Gates, 28° the court rejected both budgetary consid-
erations and arguments that less recreation for women was necessary to protect female
inmates from, sexual assaul L. 281
 The court reviewed a number of remedies available to the
government including integrating existing facilities or closing clown institutions where the
provision for sufficient recreation programs cannot be made. 282
G. Staff Integration and Inmate Rights of Privacy
Security needs in a prison place restraints upon privacy. The Supreme Court in
Hudson v. Palmer 283 held that a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
prison cell entitling him to the protection of the fourth amendment against unreasonable
searches. 284 The Court noted that imprisonment carried with it the loss of certain rights,
and that the losses were necessary to accommodate institutional needs and to achieve
internal security and safety." 85
 The majority opinion addressed itself to a prisoner's
personal effects and his cell, not to his person:2m° The dissent, commenting on this aspect
of the majority opinion, noted that the majority apparently believed that at least a
prisoner's person is "secure from unreasonable search and seizure." 287 Whether Hudson
applies to the search of the person of a prisoner or to the search of one held at a pretrial
t'a Cooper, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 67-68. But see Batton v. North Carolina, 501 F. Sup!), 1173, 1178
(E.D.N.C. 1980) (where the court denied a government request for summary judgment on female
inmate's "equal protection" claims because the government merely listed facilities available to women
without indicating frequency of use and comparing facilities available to men and women).
2" See Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 894-96 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Bukhari v. Hutto, 487
F. Supp. 1162, 1172 (ED. Va. 1980); Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d 1, 18-19, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239,
250-51 (1979).
"5 See supra note 274.
2" 487 F. Supp. 1162 (ED. Va. 1980).
277 Id. at 1171.
"" Id. at 1172.
"9 Id. at 1171; see also Canterino, 546 F. Supp. at 215.
280 98 Cal. App. 3d 1, 17-18, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 249-50 (1979).
"' Id. at 18, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
292 Id. at 20, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
285
 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
"4
 Id at 3202.
"5 Id. at 3199.
286 Id. at 3194-205.
'" Id. at 3200-01, 3208.
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detention facility is uncertain."" A clear difference exists, however, between necessary
restraints and unwarranted intrusions on the rights of prisoners such as unreasonable
strip and cavity searches.
One goal of prison officials should be to achieve security through the least intrusive
methods to preserve the inmate's right to privacy. This goal should not. be  considered as a
form of unnecessary pampering. If one of the objectives of imprisonment is to inculcate
inmates with respect for the rights of others, the state should accord inmates as much
privacy as is consistent with reasonable security considerations.'"
The mixture and proper assignment of male and female staff within a prison is
crucial to insuring privacy. Some states provide separate prisons for women staffed with
female personnel in key areas such as sleeping quarters and the hospital.a 0 Other prisons
segregate the living quarters of the male and female prisoners.' 91 The more advanced
prison systems restrict strip and body cavity searches so that these searches are conducted
in women's institutions by either trained physicians or trained female correctional per-
sonnel.'" While many of these methods for insuring privacy have come about through
statutory provisions 2" or through the accreditation process, 294 often they have resulted
from litigation.
For many years the presence of female correctional officers was the exception rather
than the rule. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2" which prohibits employment
discrimination based upon sex, provided the impel us for change. Women seeking em-
ployment in men's institutions as guards brought several actions alleging that. denial of
employment to them was a violation of Title VII. For example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson,"
the Supreme Court held that height and weight qualifications that virtually eliminated
women from obtaining positions in the Alabama corrections system were un law ful. 297 The
Court, however, further held that sex was a bona fide occupational qualification for such a
position because of the "jungle atmosphere" of that state's institutions.-'" In Gunther v.
Iowa State Men's Reformatory,' the Court, applying the same test as applied in Dothard,
held that sex was not a bona fide occupational qualification for a job as prison guard,
reasoning that the privacy rights of male prisoners can be protected by assigning female
guards to positions that would not infringe on their right to privacy.mu
2 '1' Id.
289 Id.
290 See generally SINGER AND STATSKY, RIGHTS OF THE IMPRISONED (1974).
1:81 Id.
2" Id.
293 See infra text accompanying notes 410-36.
2" 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1982); see 28 C.F.R. §§ 552.10-552.24 (1984).
295 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
299 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
197 Id. at 328-37. But see Manley v. Mobile Cd., 441 F. Supp. 1351 (S.D. Ala. 1977), where the
court held for the plaintiff and distinguished the holding front Dothard on the basis that the position
applied for would involve limited contact with inmates. Id. at 1358-59.
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 336-37.
612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980). The court of appeals in Gunther found that the prison in the
case before it was a medium security institution and did not have a lungle atmosphere" as in Dothard.
Id. at 1085. Thus, sex was not a security concern.
" The state also failed to prove that the privacy interests of the inmates would preclude female
guards from performing a large part of the duties required of the position. Id. at 1086. But see Lang
v. State Personnel Board, 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 116 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1979), where the California
Court of Appeals denied relief to a female minister who sought employment in a youth correctional
facility. The court found that for the female minister to go into the facility dormitory in the evening
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Ironically, while females have had to sue to secure their right to work in a prison for
men, there is a conspicuous absence of litigation by men attempting to work in prisons for
wolf -net-04" Prisons for women have traditionally employed male administrators and male
guards. Some state correction administrators, apparently, have not regarded women's
right to privacy to he as sacred as the corresponding right of men."'
Women have a higher regard for privacy than men because women are socialized to
be more modest. Even if the assignment of guards of an opposite sex were the same for
male and female prisons within a state correctional system, the impact would still be
greater on female prisoners. Female prisoners have been forced to vindicate their rights
to privacy, in the face of resistance by stale officials, through litigation. In Forts v. Ward ," 3
female inmates at the Bedford Hills Correctional Center objected to the assignment of
males to duties which allowed them to observe the inmates while sleeping in their cells,
while showering, and while in the infirmary."' The trial court ordered that male guards
he given different work assignments to avoid contact with female inmates during those
periods.'" On appeal, however, the United States Court of' Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed that portion of the judgment prohibiting male guards from observing
females in their cells while they slept, reasoning that privacy could be insured by issuance'
of nightgowns to inmates.'" Similarly, a suit by a male inmate, who claimed that his
privacy was violated by a female guard deliyering mail to his cell once a day, was dismissed
on the ground that the intrusion was too minimal."'
Strip and body cavity searches are particularly sensitive intrusions on prisoners'
rights to privacy. While the female plaintiffs' in Battan v. North Carolina' conceded that
such searches do not per se violate their fourth amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, they alleged that the manner in which such searches
were conducted violated their rights. They contended that sterile procedures were not
followed during vaginal searches and that male guards watched female inmates during
strip searches."'
would not interfere with the right to privacy of the residents, but that she could be subject to sexual
assault. Thus, the court determined that the state had a compelling security interest in excluding
females from the facility. Id. at 569-72. Accord Philadelphia v, Pennsylvania Human Rights Comm., 7
Pa. Commw. 500, 513, 300 A,2d 97, 103-04 (1973) where sex was held to be a bona fide occupational
qualification in a youth correction center.
a"' But see Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978),aff'd, 591
F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979), involving a male nurse denied employment by an employer because
two-thirds of the patients were women and objected to being attended by a male nurse. Due to the
small size of the institution, the hiring of a male nurse would have required an additional female
nurse to be hired.
302 Id. at 1352.
3°3
 434 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and remanded, 566 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1977), 471 F. Supp.
1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
434 F. Supp. at 948.
' Id. at 949.
3°' 621 F.2d at 1210.
Avery v. Perin, 473 F. Supp. 90, 92 (D.N.H. 1979).
501 F. Supp. 1173, 1180 (E.D.N.C. 1980).
3" Id. The court refused to find for the state on a motion for summary judgment because the
claims were actionable and there were genuine issues of material fact. Id. See Daugherty v. Harris,
476 F.2d 292, 294-95 (10th Cir. 1973) for a holding that rectal examinations of male prisoners for
security reasons are constitutional. The Daugherty rationale was followed in Barefield v. Leach, No.
10282 (D.N.M, 1974), cited in Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1078-79 (E.D. Mich. 1979),
where the court held that vaginal and rectal searches are constitutional if performed by trained
Matrons.
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As more females are employed in correctional facilities, the social attitudes that form
the underlying basis for objection to discriminatory hiring policies will change. It has
already been suggested that the continued use of sex as a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion is based upon outmoded notions of sex roles. 31° in fact, the presence of members of
the opposite sex within the institution in roles that do not unnecessarily violate the privacy
of either male or female inmates may produce psychological benefits such as minimizing
alienation and promoting rehabilitation. 3 "
H. Medical Care
Despite indications that the medical needs of women may be greater than those of
men, recent studies and cases indicate that women's prisons are less likely than men's
prisons to have full-time medical staff or adequate hospital facilities. 312 Recent studies
show that women entering correctional institutions are more likely than men are to have
medical problems when entering prison. In addition to having a higher incidence of'
asthma, drug abuse problems, seizure disorders, hypertension, diabetes, hepatitis, heart
disorders, gastrointestinal problems, and genitourinary disorders than meu, 313 many
women suffer from gynecological problems. 3 " In a study of four prisons for women in
northeastern states, eighty-six percent of the women experienced health problems during
incarceration. 3 ''
Medical services for women are so inadequate in some correctional institutions that
they have been at issue in several class action suits. 316 In Todaro v. Ward , 3" for example,
the court found that New York State had failed to provide the entire population of the
Note, Sex Discrimination in Prison Employment: The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification and
Prisoners' Privacy Rights, 65 IowA L. REV. 428, 442 (1980).
'" Id. at. 443.
3 ' 2 See Note, Sexual Segregation ,supra note 115, at 1229-730 (eighty-seven percent of the women's
prisons and twenty-seven percent of the men's prisons surveyed had no full-time physicians); see also,
Resnick and Shaw, Prisoners of Their Sex: Health Problems of Incarcerated Women, in PRISONER'S RIGHTS
SOURCE BOOK: THEORY, LITIGATION, AND PRACTICE II (Robbins ed. 1980).  [hereinafter cited as
Resnick and Shawl.
'" Novick, Della Penna, Schwarts, Kemmlinger, and Lowenstein, Health Status of the New York
City Prison Population, 15 MEDICAL CARE 205 (1977); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, VITAL &
HEALTH STATISTICS, CURRENT ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 11-13
(1981); and 25 PHARMACEUTICAL. MANUFACTURERS NEWSLETTER No. 1 (1982) (stating that sixty
percent of all visits to physicians were by women and sixty percent of all new drug prescriptions were
for women).
3" B. Atino, Analysis of Inmate Patient Profile Data, American Medical Association, Program to
Improve Medical Care and Health Services in Jails (1977).
While the AMA found that 14.6% of the women surveyed reported breast lumps, 42% had
unusual vaginal discharges, 4.2% had unusual vaginal bleeding, and 12.8% were pregnant, only
8.9% of the men surveyed had abnormalities of the penis, scrotum, and testes. Id. at 73-74. See also R.
GLICK & V. NETO,SUpra note 111, at 66; Williams, Health Care for Women Inmates in the New Mexico State
Penitentiary, PROCEEDINGS, 2D NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MEDICAL. CARE AND HEALTH SERVICE IN
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1978) (where fifty percent of the problems of women in the New
Mexico State Penitentiary were found to relate to gynecologic or obstetric pathology).
315 Sixty-two percent of the women with medical problems in the four northeastern prisons
studied considered their health problems not to be resolved. Eighty-one percent rated the medical
care as poor or very poor. The highest rating of medical care came from one prison where women
inmates received a favorable decision because of a suit involving medical care. See K. GABEL, supra
note 162, at 84.
316 See Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1977).
3 ' 7 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), a ff'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Bedford Hills Correctional Facility in New York with access to adequate medical care or
with the delivery of treatment prescribed by physicians."s At the time the suit began,
Bedford •fills contained nearly 400 women but did not have a full-time physician.'"
Delay in obtaining the services of a physician ranged from two weeks to two nionths. 32°
Furthermore, the court found inadequate evaluations of inmate complaints by the
nurse, 32 ' repeated failure to perform laboratory tests ordered, 322 long delays in the return
of laboratory results, insufficient follow-up procedures where abnormal test results were
reported," a grossly inadequate system for keeping medical records,'" and a lack of
adequate supervision of inmates in the sick wing."" In reaching its decision that Bedford
Hills violated the inmates' eighth amendment rights to medical care, the Todaro court
applied the principles expressed in Estelle v. Gamble.'" There the Supreme Court held
that the principles behind the guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment "establish
the government's obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by
incarceration."'" The Estelle Court held that "deliberate indifference to the serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,'
proscribed by the eighth amendment." 328
In a more recent case, Canterino v. Wilson,' female inmates claimed that their eighth
amendment constitutional rights were being violated by inadequate medical attention and
that their fourteenth amendment rights were being infringed because the medical care
provided to women was inferior to the care provided to men in the Kentucky correctional
system." On the eighth amendment claim, the court held that the evidence fell short of
demonstrating "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs.""i•The court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not allege denial of
medical care to any particular person but only showed deficiencies which could make
"unnecessary suffering inevitable."' On the fourteenth amendment claim, the court
held that the medical care provided to women was substantially equivalent to the care
• provided in prisons for men."
Beyond the principles established in Estelle, the quantity and quality of medical care
necessary to meet the constitutional standards is still unclear. In Edwards v. Duncan, the
court held that a prisoner is entitled to reasonable medical care." In attempting to clarify
3" 565 F.2d at 50.
3" 431 F. Supp. at 1134-36.
320 Id. at 1145-46.
32 '.Id. at 1145.
322
	 at 1147-48.
323 Id. at 1148-49.
3" Id. at 1145-46.
32s at 1139-40.
3"
 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
327 Id. at 103.
3" Id. at 104.
329 546 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
33°
 Post-Trial Brief for Plaintiffs at 1, Pat Canterino v. George Wilson, Civil No. 80-0545-L(J).
546 F. Supp. at 214.
332 546 F. Supp. at 215. See also Barefield v. Leach, Civ. No. 10282 (D.N.M. 1974), cited in
Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1078-79 (E.D. Mich. 1979), where the court also found that
the female inmate claims of inadequate medical care were unsubstantiated.
333 546 F. Supp. at 215.
331 355 F.2d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1966).
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this standard, the court in Mills v. Oliver 335 stated that, "this does not mean that every
prisoner complaint requires immediate diagnosis and care, but that, under the totality of
circumstances, adequate medical treatment be administered when and where there is
reason to believe it needed." In another attempt to define the term reasonable, the court
in Stokes v. Hurdle , 336 held that deprivation of "essential" medical care is unreasonable. 337
Furthermore the court held that:
In determining whether medical care was "essential" in a given case, the
question is whether a physician exercising ordinary skill and care would have
concluded that the symptonis evidenced a serious injury; whether the poten-
tial for harm by reason of delay or denial of medical care was substantial; and
whether such harm did result .... Hence, a deprivation of medical treatment
that seriously endangers the prisoner's well being would be actionable [under
the Civil Rights Act]. 338
These cases lead to two important. conclusions. First, the adequacy of medical care in any
prison, whether for women or men, has been determined on a case-by-case basis, analyz-
ing individual complaints according to the same standards developed in medical malprac-
tice cases. Second, the case law provides little guidance to prison administrators concern-
ing "reasonable" or "adequate" care in areas such as the ratio of doctors to inmates, the
ratio of nurses to inmates, medical training for prison medical and security staff, response
time for responding to medical needs, facilities, and access to community treatment to
supplement prison capabilities.
One of the few cases that has provided measurable standards for the delivery of
medical care to women in correctional institutions is Games v. Tay/or. 339 The institution
held sixty female prisoners. The court found delays in providing initial medical exam-
inations for newly arriving inmates, delays which resulted in some drug addicts going
"cold turkey," pregnant inmates aborting, and delay in referring inmates for psychiatric
treatment."' While the court acknowledged that a doctor had recently been assigned to
make daily visits to the institution, it nevertheless ordered that no prisoner was to be
placed in segregation for medical;psychiatric or emotional reasons unless she was exam-
ined by a physician within eight hours."' Segregation could not continue unless the
inmate was examined every twenty-four hours. 342 Pregnant inmates were to be main-
tained on methadone. 393 Inmates displaying unusual behavior were to he examined within
forty-eight hours. 344
Medical care in the correctional setting, whether for men or women, is woefully
inadequate. The problem for women is more acute, however, because of the greater
number of medical problems experienced by female inmates and the proportionately
greater number of the female inmate population affected by health problems. Failure to
335 367 F. Supp. 77, 79 (ED. Va. 1973).
33' 393 F. Supp. 757 (D. Md. 1975).
337 Id. at 761.
33' Id. See generally Isele, Constitutional Issues of the Prisoner's Right to Health Care, American
Medical Association (1978).
339
 Civil No. 159.72 (D.D.C. 1976).
3" Id.
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 id.
349 id.
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provide adequate care is undoubtedly a violation of the eighth amendment., Because
female prisoners have greater medical needs, equal or similar medical care may not be
sufficient to satisfy the mandates of the equal protection clause. Correction officials may
find it necessary to provide female prisoners with more medical professionals more often,
and dispense more medical care and advice than provided for male prisoners to comply
with equal protection standards.
I. Abortion and Pre -Natal Care Services
Prison affects the rights of pregnant women and their unborn children. The case law
supports a woman's right to procreate and her right to have an abortion. Actions of prison
officials, however, can deny both rights. In addition, actions by prison officials may be
detrimental to the health and welfare of unborn infants. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 345 the
Supreme Court declared that procreation is one of the "basic civil rights of •man .. .
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." 346 The Court invalidated a
statute providing for the sterilization of habitual criminals, holding that. state actions
affecting procreation are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 3" While there have been no
cases of female inmates being physically forced to abort a pregnancy, there have been
reports of inmates being pressured into having abortions. 348 Women who want to exercise
their constitutional right to have an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy 343
may find that right frustrated by a lack of early detection of pregnancy, when inmates
experience long periods of delay in obtaining medical evaluation and when pregnancy
tests are not administered upon admission to prison.330 The district court in Lett v.
Withworth, 351 held that to prevent irreparable harm to a prison inmate, she could not be
denied her constitutional right to have her pregnancy terminated prior to the end of the
second trimester of her pregnancy. 332 After the Supreme Court held in Maher v. Roe 33
that the state is not required to pay for abortions for indigents, some courts have ordered
that abortions be performed on women inmates who request them but that the expense
not be paid by the counties involved. 334
Once an inmate decides to give birth, the prison environment presents potential
dangers to the health and welfare of both the mother and the unborn child. The potential
pre-natal problems range from inadequate diets and drug use or abuse to abusive
treatment of pregnant inmates. Pregnant women need a diet high in protein, vitamins,
3•15
 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
346
 Id. at 541.
aat Id.
34 ' See McHugh, Protection of the Rights of Pregnant Women in Prisons and Detention Facilities, 6 NEW
ENC. J. PRISON LAW 233, 235 (1980) [hereinafter cited as McHugh].
San
	 right was established by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3.s°
 See Todaro v. Ward, 431 F. Supp. 1129, 1143-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),aff'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir.
1977), for examples of delay in delivery of various health care services.
351 Civil Action No. C-1-77-246 (S.D. Ohio 1976); see also Wolfe v. Schroering, 541 F.2d 523, 525
(6th Cir. 1976); where the court held that a third person could not veto a mother's right to have an
abortion unless the veto is to protect maternal health.
352
	 v. Withworth, Civ, Action No. C-1-77-246 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
'" 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
3" See, e.g., Doe v. Jennings, Civil Action No. 79-6810 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Comm. of Va. v,
Aldridge, (Civil Action Cir. Ct., Arlington, Va., 1979).
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and other nutrients. 3" Prison food, however, is normally low in vitamins and protein but
high in starches.'" Nutritional deficiences have been linked to high pre-natal mortality,
retardation, hypertensive disorders, brain damage, and premature delivery."' A recent
survey of twenty-six state, federal, and local correctional institutions for women revealed
that fourteen made no provisions for special diets or vitamin supplements for pregnant
inmates. 3" Some correctional facilities have been ordered to employ registered dietitians
as consultants and to provide special diets for health reasons.'"
Drug addiction and the use of drugs to control inmates are problems that can
severely affect pregnant inmates. Heroin use during pregnancy can cause premature
labor, infant mortality, and passive drug dependence in the newborn."° Many prisons,
however, do not have plans to meet the needs of the addicted mother or unborn child."
Inmates at the District of Columbia Women's Detention Center, for example, brought an
action based in part on the practice of putting new prisoners through "cold turkey"
withdrawal from methadone, a practice that can result in miscarriage and damage to a
fetus."' In its final order, the court in this action ordered that pregnant prisoners who
were maintained on methadone prior to incarceration be maintained at least temporarily
on methadone."' Moreover, the administration of tranquilizers to calm inmates and
mood-elevating drugs to counteract depression is a common practice in many prisons.
Even though such drugs can pose danger to an unborn fetus, many institutions do not test
for pregnancy before administering the drugs.'"
Conditions for delivering babies in prison have also been criticized in recent cases.
For example, a federal district court in Newman v. Akbama 363 found that the facilities for
child birth at the Tutwiler Prison for Women were so inadequate that the health and lives
of both the women and newborn were endangered. While the institution had an average
of seven or eight deliveries each year, "rtlhe delivery table has no restraints, paint is
peeling from the ceiling above it, and large segments of the linoleum floor around the
table are missing. There are no facilities to resuscitate the newborn or otherwise provide
adequate care should any complications arise during delivery."'"
J. Access to Courts and Legal Materials
Female prisons often do not make adequate .legal resources available to the prison
population. Access to the courts and legal materials is essential to insure that the female
prisoner's rights to counsel and to equal protection are not violated.'" Ready access to
legal materials and individuals trained in the law can enable many prisoners to determine
See McHugh, supra note 348, at 241.
356 Id.
357 Id.
358 id.
359
 Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 326 (D.N.H. 1977); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp.
318, 334 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
McHugh, supra note 348, at 243-44.
36' Id.
3s'
	 v. Taylor, Civil Action 159-72 (D.D.C. 1976).
363 Id.
364' McHugh, supra note 348, at 243.
365 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
'" Id. at 282-83.
367 Jacob and Sharms, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in the Criminal Correc-
tional Process, IS KAN. I,. RE.v. 493, 511 (1970).
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that many of their concerns are unfounded. Others can pursue vindication of their rights
and in the process learn that the legal system operates for their benefit.
A recent study of prisons for women in four northeastern states revealed vast
differences in the nature and quality of legal resources available.'" The study analyzed
the availability of appropriate law books, law librarians, public defenders, private attor-
neys, jailhouse lawyers, duplicating equipment, and access to telephones for contacting
attorneys. 369
 Results of the research revealed that each prison had structural weaknesses
in these areas and "missing links in the provision of legal resources prevented meaningful
use of existing materials and personnel." 370
 Use of these resources was found to be more a
function of the extent of resources available and regulations of an institution than of the
interest of inmates in pursuing redress for their legal needs."' In analyzing such needs,
the researchers found that they were ranked in the following order: child custody and
family issues, good time and jail credit issues, prison program issues, appeal and sentenc-
ing issues, disciplinary issues, detainers, and warrants.'"
The United States Supreme Court, in Bounds v. Smith,' held that "prison authorities
[must] assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by provid-
ing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from prisoners trained in
law."374
 The court of appeals had struck down the plan at issue in Bounds because it
provided women prisoners with less access to legal research facilities than male prison-
ers. 375
 The plan was discriminatory because it provided that the library for male prisoners
would contain federal and state materials, but the library for women inmates would only
contain state statutes and treatises.'"
In Glover v. Johnson,' the district court compared the law libraries and paralegal
training available to men in the Michigan state prisons with the libraries and training
available to women prisoners. Although the law library for women was less extensive than
the libraries for men, the court noted that the library for women was adequate under the
standards set forth in Bounds v. Smith."' In addition, while noting that the state paid for
the volumes necessary to meet the standards in Bounds, additions to the libraries were paid
for voluntarily by inmates through a resident benefit fund 379 financed from sales of
3°' K. GABEL, supra note 162, at 3-5, 91-140.
369 Id.
3" Id. at 4
-5.
"' Id. at 2-3, 51-88.
3" Id.
373 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
374
 Id. at 828; see also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969), where the Court also held that
if a prison does not provide some form of legal assistance to inmates, it may not bar inmates from
furnishing such assistance to other prisoners.
"3
 Smith v. Bounds, 538 F.2d 541, 543 n.1 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 817
(1977).
37° Id. at 543:45.
377
	 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
"6 Id. at 1095-96; see also Batton v. North Carolina, 501 F. Supp. 1173, 1178 (E.D.N.C. 1980),
where the court found that the library for women prisoners met the standards of Smith v. Bounds, and
was in fact superior to the libraries in most of the state's prisons.
379
 Resident benefit fund's are programs wherein a percentage of money spent by inmates is
contributed to a target fund to be used for specific agreed-upon purposes for the benefit of the entire
prison population. See MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS, Supra note 1, at 551.
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commissary goods. 3" Although the contributions to the benefit fund at the men's prison
averaged $10,000 per month, women prisoners only contributed $300 per month." 8 '
Thus, women prisoners' legal resources were less abundant than men prisoners' because
women prisoners bought fewer commissary goods; indeed there were fewer female
prisoners to do the buying.
Access to legal materials alone does not satisfy the state's obligation under Bounds. 382
The Glover court found that the female prisoners had not developed the legal expertise to
use the library and that the Prison Legal Services, an organization that provided legal
service to inmates, was limited in the kinds of cases it could handle. As a result female
inmates were left without the assistance of counsel in "critical areas of the law." 3" In
responding to a claim that the lack of a paralegal training program for women prisoners
similar to the program offered to male prisoners violated the equal protection clause and
denied women equal access to the courts, the district court in Glover held that a legal
education course for women prisoners was justified, not because a similar program was
offered at a prison for men but because skilled women were needed to provide meaning-
ful access to the courts. 3$4 The court's decision was ultimately based, not on equal
protection grounds, but on the sixth amendment right to counsel.
In a similar case, female inmates at the Kentucky Correctional Institution for Women
brought suit, in Canterino v. Wilson,385 claiming that the law library was inadequate and
that they had inadequate access to legal service provided by the public defenders' of ►ce. 3"
The district court held that to bring access to the courts for male and female prisoners to
constitutional parity, on equal protection grounds:
female prisoners must be provided with a library that is equivalent to the
libraries at two of the prisons for men, that the amount of time for women to
use the library be increased and that women prisoners be provided the
equivalent of at least one half-time attorney to assist in all areas including
habeas corpus and other civil matters. 387
All prisoners have a right to counsel and legal resources in the prison setting. Courts
generally seem to disfavor unequal resources or unequal access to resources between male
and female prisoners and have, as a general rule, found equal protection violations when
states did not provide parity of resources and essential equality of opportunity to use
those resources.
36° Commissary goods include personal equipment or provisions, such as, deodorant, chewing
gum, and candy, the distribution of which to the general prison population is regulated. See MANUAL,
OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 551.
38 Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1095.
3"2
	 430 U.S. at 817.
a" Glover, 478 F. Supp. at 1095.
Id. at 1097.
3"s
	 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
386 Id. at 203.
"7 Id. at 216. The question of whether a state could provide female and male prisoners with a
different form of legal service consistent with Bounds has not been decided. For example, under
Bounds it would appear to be constitutional for a state to provide female prisoners with adequate
assistance of legal counsel and male prisoners with an adequate law library and paralegal training. A
subsidiary question, therefore, would be whether a state's rationale that women have less skill in the
legal areas, as was found in Glover, would be sufficient justification for disparity in treatment.
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K. Interrelationship Among Specific Elements of the Institutional Environment
and the Correctional Process
Traditionally, determinations regarding which institution to assign a sentenced of-
fender, and the security classification of the inmate within an institution, have been the
most important decisions affecting inmates because they affect the level of freedom and
access to inmates' programs, family, and treatment. The rehabilitative and treatment
programs must be available to inmates once the assignment decision is made. The
effectiveness of institutional administrators in arriving at such decisions determines not
only the quality of institutional life benefits that an inmate may obtain from incarceration,
but ultimately may affect society as it copes with former prisoners and their families.
Theoretically, the goals and values of an institution form an important element of the
correctional process because obviously all activities are directed toward their achievement.
Rules, regulations, and standards are not only aimed at achieving the goals but affect
program participation by inmates and the institution's psychosocial environment. The
psychosocial environment involves not only the relationships among inmates but also
relationships between inmates and correctional staff. To a certain degree it may involve
intrafamily relationships. It is the responsibility of management to coordinate these
elements. Arguably, the most important influences affecting an institution are legislation,
court decisions, family contacts, and information concerning community attitudes and
acceptance of ex-offenders. In the final analysis it is the interrelationship of these ele-
ments of a correctional institution and these external influences that have resulted in a
need for female inmates to seek vindication of their rights through the courts.
IV. BEYOND THE COURTS - ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR ACHIEVING CHANGE
Although class action suits by female inmates can be an effective means for reducing
discriminatory conditions between men and women in state correctional systems and for
vindicating other rights of prison inmates, there are several negative results stemming
from litigation. First, there is a diversion of resources that could be used to foster
meaningful reform toward payment of the costs of litigation. Second, the orders and
opinions of a court are of limited applicability in states other than the court's own
jurisdiction. Third, litigation can be viewed as a symptom of a reactive or crisis-oriented
government rather than a proactive one devoted to meeting the needs of its citizens.
A number of alternatives to litigation exist that are not only preferable to court
ordered reform in a democratic society but are also theoretically more responsive to the
needs of both inmates and society. This section of the article will discuss three such
alternatives: state legislation, which is often closer to the immediate problems of the state
prisons; uniform national standards, which can provide general guidelines and standards
for all prisons to meet; and the equal rights amendment and New Federalism," which in
combination may provide a whole host of new solutions to old and new problems.
A. State Legislation
While state legislatures can be presumed to intend that female and male prisoners be
treated equally, equal treatment often is not achieved. Express legislation at the state level
is needled to correct existing disparities. Statutes in most states do not explicitly require
equality in classification, programming, treatment, policies, procedures or in other areas
of prison life. Ironically, although correctional institutions for women were designed to
emphasize rehabilitation rather than punishment, budgetary allocations and the adminis-
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tration of available facilities have often not accomplished that objective. At least one
study indicates that classification and inmate discipline systems can actually be counter-
rehabilitative,'" and further reveals that male prisoners often have greater opportunities
for treatment, vocational training, education, and work than women. A review of state
statutes throughout the country indicates that very few states mandate equal treatment
and programming for women and men. Although the following discussion is not in--
tended to provide an exhaustive review of such laws, it provides some examples of typical
legislation. Some statutes can be considered more progressive because they specifically
mandate equal programming for men and women.'" While some state codes make no
reference to equal treatment, the respective states have administered the statutes to
effectuate relative equality.
The most predominant type of statute throughout the country mandates the separa-
tion of sleeping quarters for male and female prisoners, unless the prisoners are married
to each other."' Some states mandate that female prisoners be supervised only by female
guards392 and searched only by female guards."' Many states also have statutes concern-
ing custody of the children of inmates or provisions for the termination of parental rights.
One of the most beneficial statutes for purposes of maintaining and fostering family
relationships is found in Maryland where the governor is authorized to parole, commute
or suspend a female prisoner's sentence when she is about to give birth.'" If the mother's
sentence is only suspended, the state allows the father or other relatives to care for the
child until the mother's release."' In California, female prisoners with less than two years
to serve on their sentence and with children less than two years old can be released to a
public or private facility in the community to live with their children. Community facilities
are to provide pediatric care and are directed to care for the mother's mental stability and
to assist the mother in developing good mothering habits as well as the ability to function
in the community upon release."' Other statutes merely allow mothers to maintain
custody of a newborn while in prison for one year, 397 eighteen months 38" or two years. 399
Upon termination of this period, or in some cases immediately after birth, these statutes
provide for either foster care of the child until completion of the mother's sentence or, if
in the "best interests" of the child, termination of parental rights.'"
Legislative standards for medical care within prisons vary substantially from state to
state. The most comprehensive and far-reaching statute is found in Wisconsin where the
legislature mandated that "standards for delivery of health services in state correctional
institutions . . . shall be based on the essential standards of the American Medical
Association for health services in prisons." 40 ' Several states have statutes that provide for
See generally K. GABEL, supra note 162.
3159 Id.
See, e.g., CAl.. PENAL CODE §§ 4002, 4110 (West 1982).
381
 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-62 (West 1975).
392 CAL. PENAL. CODE § 4021 (West 1982).
"a Id.; FLA. STAT. ANN § 944.24(1) (West 1973). Contra Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.884(2) (Callaghan
Supp. 1984), which allows body cavity searches by the opposite sex.
394 Mn. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 699 (1982).
"' Id. See also VA. CODE § 53.1-41 (1982).
396 CAL. PENAL. CODE §§ 3410-3424 (West 1982).
3:97 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 38, § 1003-6-2(g) (Smith-Hurd 1982).
394 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 1968).
399 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-26.2 (West 1982).
1°4' See id.; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-69 (West 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.24(2) (West 1973).
401 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 53.385 (West Supp. 1984).
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medical treatment involving limited areas such as abortion and child delivery. 402
 Often a
female prisoner may have the physician and surgeon of her choice for determination of
pregnancy and delivery, but she or her family must pay for the choice of not using
institutional physicians. 4" A Tennessee statute authorizes a doctor, rather than a correc-
tional administrator, to decide when hospitalization outside of an institution is necessary
for any type of treatment."'"
California is one of the few states that mandates, by legislation, that men and women
in county detention facilities have equal access to vocational, recreational and treatment
programs and privileges except when the number of one sex in the institution is so low
that diversion of resources is not justified. 405 Other state statutes merely authorize the
establishment of educational and rehabilitation programs in correctional institutions for
women, without reference to whether they must be equivalent to the programs provided
for men.'" While many states have only one correctional institution for women, Pennsyl-
vania has authorized establishment of regional community treatment centers for the
treatment and rehabilitation of women. 407 Some states have statutes that allow women to
take part in work release programs.'" New York authorizes the use of its work release
provision for release of a woman to care for her family when it is necessary and reason-
able.'"
This selective overview of existing state statutes and practices indicates that results
achieved when individual states attempt to establish guidelines for equal and effective
treatment of women in the criminal justice system are inconsistent and unpredictable.
While state legislation has advantages over litigation, variances among states in the levels
of equality of treatment and the comprehensiveness of services provided to female
inmates suggest that adoption and enforcement of uniform national standards may
provide a more effective means of bringing about needed reform.
B. Uniform National Standards
The adoption of national uniform correctional standards would be a positive and
substantial step in the direction of achieving gender equality. -"° Case law has thus far
proved to be inadequate in providing correctional administrators with explicit minimum
standards for operating prisons.'" Often contradictory and applicable only to narrow
factual problems, decisional law involving correctional institutions is frequently so broad
and general that it provides little guidance to other states. These opinions do not provide
a model for reform but are instead remedy specific to the facts presented by each case.
4" CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3406, 4023.6 (West 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 699 (1982); see also
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 127, § 21 (West 1974).
4" CAI.. PENAL ConE §§3406, 4023.6 (West 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 699 (1982); see also •
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 21 (West 1974).
4°4
 TENN, CODE ANN. § 4-6-109 (1979).
4" CAL. PENAL CODE § 4029 (West 1982).
4°8 See ILL. REV. STAT. 1968, ch. 23 § 2802 (repealed by P.A. 77-2097, § 8-5-1 (1973)); ILL. REV.
STAT. 1973, ch. 38, § 1003-2-2(a), (b), (d) (West 1984); END. STAT. § 11-7.9-9 (1976); OHIO REv. ConE
ANN. § 5143.25 (Baldwin 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 61, § 578 (Purdon 1964); TENN. CODE ANN. §
41-825 (repealed, now § 41-5-103 (1982)); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. tit, 72, § 72.15.050 (West 1982).
407
 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 460.11 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
409 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN., tit. 64, ch. 9b-2 (2) (1983).
409 N.Y. CottuEcT. LAW § 891 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1984-85).
410 For discussion on national standard see infra text accompanying notes 412-36.
Ott
	
mentioned previously, supra text accompanying notes 4-6, cases and the rules of law
derived from cases tend to be fact specific.
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In recent years a number of national organizations 412 have established comprehen-
sive sets of standards to assist correctional administrators in improving all aspects of
prisons. 413
 Courts most frequently cite the standards developed by the American Correc-
tional Association (ACA) and American Medical Association (AMA). 414
 These standards
reflect the consensus of correctional administrators and other professionals throughout
the country on areas of vital importance to daily operations of correctional facilities and
the health and well-being of the prisoners. 11 ''
Many of the ACA standards go beyond established legal requirements and have been
cited by prison plaintiffs as partial bases for their causes of action, 416 The purpose of the
ACA standards is to provide guidelines to correctional administrators for use in develop-
ing and evaluating programs to meet the needs of prisoners and to insure protection of
prisoners rights without sacrificing institutional security. The effect of implementing
these standards has been improved prison relations and improved prison conditions. Of
the 164 ACA Adult Correctional Institution standards thirty-three percent are based
upon case law. 417 Similarly, thirty-eight percent of the 148 Adult Local Detention Facility
standards have supporting case law. 41 s Some of the key areas of standard development
relevant to the topic of this article include: access to the courts, counsel and legal
materials, visitation and contact with family, medical care, classification, rehabilitation and
recreation, treatment, and sex discrimination. The standards reflect recent case law but
the standards address more than the problems raised in cases — they provide a general
framework for how a prison should be run. Organizations that have developed correc-
tional standards are providing courts and correctional administrators with specific and
articulated parameters by which correctional institutions can be evaluated to determine
whether inmate rights are being preserved.
Most ACA standards are gender-neutral. The ACA made an effort to avoid drafting
an extensive set of standards specifically for women because of the belief that unequal
412 Organizations establishing standards for prisons include: Association of State Correctional
Administrators; American Association of Mental Health Professionals in Corrections; Association on
I'rograms for Female Offenders; American Correctional Association; American Medical Association
— Health Services in Corrections Institutions; American Bar Association — Committee on Correc-
tional Facilities and Services. Most of these organizations are voluntary associations interested in
improving the conditions of prison life.
4 ' 3 American Medical Association, Standards on Medical Care in Correctional Institutions;
Standards, American Correctional Association, Commission on Accreditation; D. SECUREST, Correc-
tional Standards and Policy Programs .of American Correctional Association, Federal Standards for
Corrections, U.S. Department of Justice; 1983 ABA COMMITTEE ON CORRECTIONAL Encii.rriEs AND
SERVICES REP.
4 ' 4 For purposes of this article the following ACA standards were reviewed: Manual of Stan-
dards for the Administration of Correctional Agencies; Standards for Adult Correctional Institu-
tions; and Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities. The source of those standards is the
American Correctional Association, Rockville, Maryland, April, 1981. In addition, the author has
consulted AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF MEDICAL CARE AND
HEALTH SERVICES IN JAILS (1981).
ACA STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 1981); AMA STANDARDS
FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN JAILS (July 1982).
41 " See Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F.
Supp. 174 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
4 ' 7 Comparison of Adult Institution Standards with case law by the Commission on Accredita-
tion for Corrections, College Park, Maryland (June 1982).
410 Id.
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treatment would result from publication and implementation of those standards:119
 Nev-
ertheless, a limited number of standards are drafted specifically for women and provide
for essential equality in specific areas of concern. Under the ACA standards, if males and
females are housed in the same institution, the women are to be provided with separate
sleeping quarters and equal access to service and programs. This latter standard would
seem to include legal and medical services as well as work release and vocational training
programs. Institutions housing only female inmates must provide essential equality with
male institutions in virtually every aspect affecting the inmates' prison life. 4"
Although these standards do not constitute sources of legal or constitutional rights,
they should be adopted by the courts as guidelines in passing judgment on prisoners'
claims. Unfortunately some courts have altogether denied the validity of the standards as
a proper source of inmate rights. For example, in Grubbs v. Bradley, 42 ' the court held. that,
"while guidelines of professional organizations such as the American Correctional Associ-
ation represent desirable goals fbr penal institutions, neither they nor the opinions of
experts can be regarded as providing constitutional minima." 4'-2
419 D. SECHREST, CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM STANDARDS FOR WOMEN (May 1979) (prepared for
Regional Training Seminar on Planning and Evaluation Programs for Women Offenders, College
Park, Maryland).
"' Pertinent Standards For Adult Correctional Institutions include:
2-4133 Existing, renovation, addition, new plant
When males and females are housed in the same institution there are separate
sleeping quarters. (Important).
2-4331
When male and female inmates are housed in the same institution, there are separate
sleeping quarters, but equal access to all available services and programs. Neither sex is
denied opportunities solely on the basis of their smaller number in the population.
(Essential).
2-4332
Institutions housing female inmates provide essential equality with male institutions
in institutional programs, living conditions, access to community programs and re-
sources,.employment opportunities, access to family and other community associations,
and decision-making processes affecting status, activities and terms of incarceration.
(Essential).
2-4333
Written policy and procedure require that comprehensive counseling and assistance
are provided to pregnant inmates in keeping with their expressed desires in planning
for their unborn children. (Essential).
DISCUSSION: Counseling and social services should be available from either facility
staff or community agencies to assist inmates in making decisions such as whether to
keep their child, give the child up for adoption or consent to an abortion. It is advisable
that a formal legal opinion as to the law relating to abortion be obtained, and based
upon that opinion, written policy and defined procedures should be developed for each
jurisdiction. (See related standard 2-4481).
2-4412
The institution provides a variety of work assignments that afford inmates an oppor-
tunity to learn job skills and develop good work habits and attitudes that they can apply
to jobs after they are released. (Important).
DISCUSSION: Whenever possible, inmate work assignments provide experience rele-
vant to the current job market. Work assignments for women are not limited to
traditional tasks assigned to women. (See related standard 2-4332).
ACA STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 1981).
42 ' 552 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
422 Id. at 1124; see also, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543-44, n.27 (1979); McMurry v. Phelps,
533 F, Supp. 742, 750 (W.D. La. 1982).
March 1985}	 DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT	 433
Other courts, however, have been persuaded by the standards in a variety of areas.
The most frequently cited standards are the ACA standards concerning prison cell size
and living space for inmates. 422 For example, in Brittle v. Anderson, the court reviewed
ACA, American Public Health (APH) and National Advisory Commission standards and
cited with approval the APH standards for square feet per inmate in cells and dor-
mitories. 424 In adopting environmental standards For cell space, water, fire protection, air,
and food the court noted that, lijt is incumbent on the incarcerating body to provide the
individual with a healthy habilitative environment . . . . With habilitation assured, then
possibly or probably the inmate can decide to rehabilitate himself." 425
The most comprehensive decision concerning standards was handed down in Ken-
drick v. Bland in reference to inmates placed in restricted confinement.'" Administrators
of the Kentucky correctional system were ordered to review ACA and other standards
and to develop a plan to deal with environmental factors such as lighting, ventilation,
temperature, and water; medical and health; programs such as education and recreation:
access to law and regular libraries; visitation and correspondence; food service; social
interaction; and length of confinement within a cell. 421
Of all the standards applied by courts, the standards on health care have had
particular impact. AMA and ACA standards for health care have been compared with the
status of care in several cases. In Kendrick v. Bland, defendants were ordered to submit a
plan for providing emergency medical care which met ACA standards. 428 In response to a
suit by inmates at the Lucas County Correctional Center in Ohio, the correctional center
commissioners contracted with a physician for provision of medical services in accordance
with AMA Standards for Accreditation of Medical Care and Health Services in Jails. 420
The court in Ruiz v. Estelle reviewed ACA standards for inmate to doctor ratio.' At least
one state mandates, by legislation, that correctional institutions meet AMA standards for
medical care.' 3 '
Courts have relied on food and sanitation standards from a variety of organizations.
Food service sanitation was evaluated in Hendrix v. Faulkner in light of the 1976 Food
Service Sanitation Manual of the United States Food and Drug Administration. 43' in Jones
Wittenberg, a fourteen-day cycle menu that meets National Academy of Science and
ACA standards was proposed to meet the nutritional needs of prisoners in the Ohio
correctional system. 433
The standards, drafted by private organizations, provide specific and articulated
norms by which correctional institutions should be judged to determine whether or not
423 See, e.g., Canterino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174, 198 (W.D. Ky. 1982); Kendrick v. Bland, 541
F. Supp. 21, 29 (W.D. Ky. 1981); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1282-83 (S.D. Tex. 1980);
Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14, 17, 22, 35 (D.P.R, 1979); Battle v. Anderson, 447 F. Supp. 516,
525-26 (E.D. Okla. 1977).
424 447 F. Supp. 516, 525 (E.D. Okla. 1977).
425
541 F. Supp. 21, 29-31 (W.D. Ky. 1981).
421 Id. at 33.
4" Id. at 38-39.
429 Jones v. Wittenburg, 509 F. Supp. 653. 685 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
503 F. Supp. 1265, 1308 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
43' Wis. STAT. ANN, § 53.385 (West Supp. 1984).
432 525 F. Supp. 435, 488 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
4" 509 F. Supp. 653, 667, 669 (N.D. Ohio 1980). See also supra notes 351-53 and accompanying
text. Other areas where standards have been used include classification and electric equipment.
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inmate rights are being infringed. This determination can be accomplished by individual
prison administrators implementing the ideas embodied in the standards or by courts
adopting the standards as a constitutional minimum when reviewing claimed violations of
prisoners' rights. The adoption, implementation and adherence to these standards will
improve the psychosocial environment in prison.
The ACA Commission on Accreditation has responsibility -for evaluating correctional
institutions to determine whether they can be accredited as complying with the ACA
Standards. Federal institutions are required to meet the standards set by the Federal
Bureau of Prisons but state institutions are not. 434 In recent years, however, the accredita-
tion process has been a major factor in states receiving federal grants to improve correc-
tional institutions. Receipt of federal funds for corrections was based upon a state's efforts
to achieve approval of its institutions by the National Institute of Corrections. 435 In
addition, correctional administrators can use accreditation as a tool in fighting lawsuits by
showing substantial compliance with recognized standards. Thus, while accreditation of
state institutions is not mandated, it is highly desirable and beneficial. As of January 1983,
adult correctional institutions of the federal government and at least some institutions in
eighteen states had received accreditation. Correctional institutions for women in eight
states and of the federal government were accredited. Some adult local detention facilities
in nine states were also accredited. 438 The irony here is that the least equivocal and
strongest standards come from correctional administrators who often require more of
their own institution than the minimum standards require.
C. ERA and the "New Federalism"
Despite the failure of the federal Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to gain ratifica-
tion, state equal rights legislation and constitutional provisions can still provide a viable
means to eliminate gender disparity in the criminal justice system by requiring equality of
treatment, where necessary and practical, with men. In the early 1960's the President's
Commission on the Status of Women stated that a constitutional amendment was needed
to assure equality of rights for men and women, and called upon the American judiciary
to clarify and eliminate all existing constitutional ambiguities hindering the achievement
of equal rights for women. 437
 This statement served as the impetus for the various legal
attacks launched in the 1960's against statutes alloting longer prison sentences to women
offenders than to their male counterparts. 438
 Although some states have changed their
previously discriminatory sentencing practices, 439
 reliance upon the judiciary to resolve
the inequities of this situation absent a constitutional compulsion to effect change has
generally failed, and suggests an argument for a national ERA. 44°
434 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 9042 (1982).
435 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 4351 (1982).
436 COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION, AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL. ASSOCIATION, SURVEY (1983).
43T supra note 78, at 355, citing THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN
REPORT, AMERICAN WOMEN (Supp. 1961) (established by Executive Order No. 10,980, 3 C.F.R. 138),
wherein it stated that:
Since the commission is convinced that the U.S. Constitution now embodies equality of
rights for men and women, we conclude that a constitutional amendment need now be
sought to establish this principle. But judicial clarification is imperative in order that
remaining ambiguities with respect to constitutional protection of women's rights be
eliminated.
Id.
433 Temin, supra note 78, at 355.
439 Id. at 361-62.
44° Id. at 371.
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Some people believe that sexual segregation in prison is yet another discriminatory
practice of the American correctional system. Based upon obsolete theories about
hypothetically differing security and rehabilitative needs that exist between female and
male offenders, 44 ' sexual segregation prevents standardized treatment among incarcer-
ated members of both genders"' and results in differential treatment manifested in
physical surroundings, recreational activities, staffing personnel, and educational pro-
grams.'" As this article has illustrated, incarcerated women are arguably victimized by a
correctional system that assigns to them a status different than the status of the male
offender. Allegedly benevolent in its objectives, this assignment places women offenders
at a social, treatment, and vocational disadvantage. Enactment of the ERA would have
been a step towards remedying these disadvantages. 4'4
Ratification of the ERA might have resulted in sexually integrated correctional
institutions which in turn might have eliminated the disparate treatment to which male
and female offenders are currently subjected. 98 Some ERA advocates contend that both
quantitative and qualitative differences existing between the educational programs avail-
able to men and those offered to women may haye been similarly eliminated, 948 while
assignments to prison industries and work details could have been made on a gender-
neutral basis under the influence of the ERA."' In the hands of jurists enlightened by the
constitutional mandate of a ratified ERA, the amendment could have been an invaluable
tool in correcting some of the blatant disparities of gender based incarceration. While it
seems unlikely that if the ERA had been passed it would have been used to integrate each
correctional facility and program, it may have provided equality or parity of program
opportunity. As it now stands, the advocates of the ERA must embark on yet another
ten-year voyage toward ratification. As this article has indicated, other routes can be taken
to aid the female offender.
The "New Federalism,"448 in its fervor to free the federal government from involve-
441 The obsolescence of these theories was superbly illustrated in State v. Heitman, 105 Kan.
139, 146-48, 181 P. 630, 633-34 (1919), wherein the court noted that:
It required no anatomist, physiologist, psychologist or psychiatrist to tell the Legislature
that women are different from men. In structure and function human beings are still as
they were in the beginning "Male and Female as created He them." It is a patent and
deep lying fact that these fundamental anatomical and physiological differences affect
the whole psychic organization. They create the differences in personality between men
and women and personality is the predominating factor in delinquent careers ... [Title
female offender not merely requires, but deserves, on account of matters touching the
perpetuation and virility of the species, correctional treatment different from the male
offender, in both kind and degree • . . Let it be conceded that the industrial farm for
women may fail to accomplish the results hoped for; the statute represents a serious
effort on the part of the Legislature to deal justly with a subject of great public concern,
and this Court is not authorized to declare the classification . . . is either arbitrary or
unreasonable.
Id.
"2 Note, Sexual Segregation, supra note 115, at 1231.
44 ' Id. at 1237.
444 Id. at 1264.
495 Id. at 1267.
446 Id.
447 Id.
"" The "New Federalism" is a political plan instituted by the Reagan Administration to reduce
the activity of all three branches of the federal government in areas of "local" concern to the states.
The plan is supposed to return to the states the power that is rightfully theirs and which the federal
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ment in the affairs of individual states, has effectively redirected the cause of equal
protection for women back to the states. One result of the New Federalism has been to
throw institutional plaintiffs out of federal court leaving them without any assurance of a
proper forum in which to air their grievances. Federal court, however, is not the panacea
of civil rights that it was twenty years ago. Today's federal judiciary, filled with conserva-
tive Reagan appointees, is less likely to be sympathetic to the claims of prisoners, much
less women prisoners claiming discrimination. State courts can mold remedies designed to
fill the gap that exists between present conditions and future legislation, but like all
judicial actions, these remedies will be narrow. State legislatures can be petitioned to pass
their own versions of an equal rights amendment guaranteeing essential equal treatment.
Many of the states already possess their own version of an ERA and are mindful that
passage of the federal ERA may result in federal preemption of the state provisions.'"
Intrastate lobbying may result in ERAs or women-oriented correctional legislation in the
remaining states, while judicial pressure could broaden the scope of women's rights in
those states presently possessing equal rights amendments to their constitutions. The
combined effect of lobbying and other pressure would afford incarcerated women an
avenue of escape from gender-based incarceration and its corresponding inequities.
Despite previous failures of state initiatives in this area, as the attention of the public is
drawn to the area of women's rights, the local ground for this issue will become increas-
ingly fertile and remedial state legislation will undoubtedly become more and more
common in the years that lie ahead.
One danger in viewing the New Federalism as the answer to the problems faced by
women prisoners is that it can result in a "false federalism." While state and federal
officials may demand more local control in eradicating inequality, their words are not
always matched by concomitantly necessary requests for local funds to finance the needed
results. Likewise, federal officials, who are quick to jump on the band wagon of New
Federalism because a transfer of responsibility is an easy means to "pass-the-buck" to local
and state governments, may find that in reality local and state governments lack the
financial resources ;mcl desire necessary to resolve the problems. Furthermore, while
some states have the resources and are willing to expend them to improve the plight of'
women offenders, many local criminal justice systems and other states do not. Thus,
without a commitment for reform at the federal level, the best that can be expected is a
non-uniform and disparate approach to meeting the needs of women in the criminal
justice system.
CONCLUSION
Development of an intermediate test for reviewing claims of gender-based discrimi-
nation has opened the courts to women and provided a means for obtaining a semblance
of equality or parity with men in the criminal justice system. The results under judicial
application of the intermediate standard of review are varied, a circumstance that leads to
the conclusion that the courts may not be institutionally equipped to provide a wholly
government had usurped in the past. The result of its implementation is to give back to the stales
fiscal and political responsibility on matters of public health, safety and welfare concerning state
residents.
"9 See CAL.. CIVIL CODE §§ 51, 52 (West 1982): Mo. CONST. art. 46; MASS. CONST. pt . 1, art. I; PA.
STAT. ANN. art. 1, § 28 (Purdon Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN, § 766.15 (West 1982). This list is
intended to be representative and not cumulative.
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satisfactory solution to the problem of disparate treatment of female offenders in the
criminal justice system.
While parity is being sought it is questionable whether parity is an appropriate goal in
all areas. The traditional social presumption is that women have a stronger need than
men for maintaining family relationships, caring for children, privacy, and medical care.
In addition, there is a greater need to protect women from rape and other sexual crimes.
Current law, however, does not attempt to reconcile proportionate needs, but instead
simply concentrates on parity.
A review of the literature concerning state correctional systems reveals some con-
tradictory results and trends both in the areas of prison administration and the law. 45° For
example, while many sentencing provisions and criminal statutes have been aimed at
benefiting women, indeterminate sentencing has penalized women and benefited men.
Traditionally, women were considered more receptive to rehabilitation than men.
Whether that theory is correct has been difficult to test because those who have been
charged with responsibility for effectuating rehabilitation have often invoked contradic-
tory policies and procedures based on gender stereotypes. Perhaps blame can be placed
on systems that hire personnel to staff women's correctional institutions, who were not
sensitive to the needs of women or understanding of the means for fostering rehabilita-
tion. When decisions were made to place prisons in isolated rural areas, for example, the
motivational force and the rehabilitative influence of a family were rarely considered.
Similarly, policies and procedures that discourage visitation and terminate parental rights
are also often counterproductive. A failure to view women as possessing the same needs as
men in areas such as education, training, employment, and recreation has resulted in
gross disparities between men and women in providing for programming, treatment and
recreation within the same state correctional systems. Most certainly, as the years pass, the
disparities are lessening. Although many of the cases cited in this article are over ten years
old, recent cases indicate that vast disparities still exist.
In reviewing the limited number of cases that have been reported, certain findings
are readily apparent. First, the detailed survey presented in this article indicates that the
existing disparities found are pervasive. Second, and perhaps more important in terms of
viewing the courts as the source of remedies to establish parity of treatment for men and
women in the criminal justice system, litigation is risky, expensive, and needlessly wastes
time and resources that could be used more productively to bring about reform. Third,
reliance on litigation in this area is misplaced given the ever-changing philosophies and
orientations of the judiciary toward women. Recent Supreme Court decisions exhibit a
shift from use of the rational basis test for gender discrimination, where women almost
always lost, to the strict scrutiny test where a plaintiff in a suspect class will be likely to
prevail, to the new substantial relation or intermediate test. 45 ' Unfortunately, the substan-
tial relation test, as with many other broad judicial doctrines, places extensive burdens of
proof on both the plaintiff and defendant. 45 ' With the decline of both federal and state
support For legal organizations that provide free legal assistance to the poor, use of the
See supra, note 417.
451 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (rational basis test applied, but female plaintiff
successful); Frontier() v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (strict scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976) (intermediate lest); Hogan v. Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (inter-
mediate test).
4" Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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courts by female offenders to vindicate their rights has become increasingly difficult. 453 As
a result, legal aid, public defender offices, and national organizations are becoming more
selective in taking on prisoner' rights cases. This selectivity is probably comforting to those
correctional administrators and legislators reluctant to provide parity among male and
female prisoners.
One of the difficulties in writing this type of article is that by its nature it is critical in a
negative sense. People do not sue to show that their life is good. Similarly, the literature
on prison matters most often emphasizes negative conditions. The last section of this
article, which discussed alternatives to litigation as means to achieve change, 454 em-
phasized that some states are concerned with the rights of female inmates. Many state
legislators and correctional professionals are involved in various groups developing
national standards, and other citizens are actively pursuing correctional reform. Some of
the statutes and uniform national standards are representative of a proactive approach to
prison reform. Rather than relying on the patchwork directives of court ordered correc-
tional reform, legislative initiative and efforts to implement uniform standards offer a
more productive and efficient approach toward gender parity. Only after this view is
adopted can inmates turn their attention away from seeking vindication of their rights in
this area of harm caused by government and focus on self-improvement and rehabilita-
tion.
45] M. ROY, WOMEN IN JAIL: PROBLEMS, PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES (1979); Jacobs and Sharms,
Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in the Criminal Correctional Process, 18 KAN, L. Rev.
511 (1970). See Clover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (D. Mich. 1979).
454 See supra text accompanying notes 388-453.
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